Mathematics and Gender: A General History of Recent Research and Common Perceptions. by Reeves, Mary E
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1993
Mathematics and Gender: A General History of
Recent Research and Common Perceptions.
Mary E. Reeves
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reeves, Mary E., "Mathematics and Gender: A General History of Recent Research and Common Perceptions." (1993). LSU
Historical Dissertations and Theses. 5665.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5665
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
U niversity M icrofilm s International 
A B ell & H ow ell Inform ation C o m p a n y  
3 0 0  North Z e e b  R oad . Ann Arbor. Ml 4 8 1 0 6 -1 3 4 6  USA  
3 1 3 /7 6 1 -4 7 0 0  8 0 0 /5 2 1 -0 6 0 0

O rder N u m b er 9419919
M athem atics and gender: A  general history o f recent research  
and com m on perceptions
Reeves, Mary E., Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1993
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

MATHEMATICS AND GENDER:
A GENERAL HISTORY 
OF RECENT RESEARCH AND COMMON PERCEPTIONS
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of Curriculum and Instruction
by
Mary E . Reeves 
S., Louisiana State University in Shreveport, 
M. A., Louisiana State University, 1990 
December, 1993
In memory of my father 
Bert Lee Reeves 
1914 - 1993
He taught me to believe 
in the power of education 
and in myself
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There are so many people responsible for the creation 
of something like this that it is impossible to list them 
all. However, the contributions of some are so 
significant that they immediately come to mind.
I must begin with my family, my husband and my 
parents, as well as his parents and my sister and her 
family. Their continued unwavering support has been 
crucial to the completion of this project. Thank you for 
loving me through all of this.
Next, I must thank William Doll, my major professor, 
for the encouragement, comments, and suggestions that he 
was always ready to provide. He is truly wonderful, and 
under his guidance I have learned more than is evident in 
this document. His caring and concern for me as a student 
and a human being have provided me with a rare glimpse of 
what "teaching" really means and how wonderful good 
teaching can be for the teacher and the student.
I am thankful, too, to my fellows at LSU, those who 
went before and those who came after. Your examples, 
questions, and support were dear to me, especially in the 
"dark days" of writing.
I also wish to thank all my teachers, both admirable 
and not, for the inspiration to follow proudly in those 
harassed and belittled footsteps. I include in this group
the members of my dissertation committee, who taught me so 
much.
I must also acknowledge the comfort and support of 
many friends, Sondra, Patti and Daniel, Robert, Lynda,
John (all of you), Margaret,•Susan, Wen-Song, Molly.
Thanks for everything -- encouragement, sympathy, ideas, 
and not knocking or calling when I was writing.
Finally, a general word of thanks to all those who 
are unnamed, unknown, and unknowable who have touched my 




History is a discipline of aggregate bias. A 
history may emphasize social events, or cultural 
or political or economic or scientific or 
military or agricultural or artistic or 
philosophical. It may, if it possesses the 
luxury of voluminousness or the arrogance of 
superficiality, attempt to place nearly equal 
emphasis upon each of the these aspects. . . .
If there is anything which the writer has learned 
. . . it is that the fullness of existence
embodies an overwhelmingly intricate balance of 
defined, ill-defined, undefined, moving, 
stopping, dancing, falling, singing, coughing, 
growing, dying, timeless and time-bound molecules 
-- and the spaces in between. (Robbins, 1971, p. 
114)
Ostranenie (Russian): Art as defamiliarization;
making familiar perceptions seem strange. . . .
The familiarization of the world is an all-too- 
common phenomenon in an age when you can travel 
to virtually every major city in every country 
and stay in the same kind of room that is part of 
the same hotel chain, eat the same fast food, and 
watch the same television shows. But the 
defamiliarization of the world, the renewal of 
perceptions, is necessary for our mental well­
being. (Rheingold, 1988, pp.84-85)
What follows, this dissertation, will tell a story 
about many things: the development of a technological
crisis in popular American consciousness, and an 
educational answer to it; the continuing evolution of 
feminism; the proliferation of interest into the problem of 
"underachievement" of females in mathematics; the struggles 
of one graduate student to articulate and perhaps 
understand her own path. This is not just a story; in many 
deeply personal ways it is my story.
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It is difficult to say when my story begins, and where 
this telling should begin. It could, of course, begin with 
my birth, or that of my parents. But it could also begin 
with the "shot heard 'round the world," the crucifixion, or 
the big bang. Still perhaps a better place to begin this 
telling is with the first thoughts of Descartes, the fall 
of Vicksburg, or with the publication of Carson's Silent 
Spring and Friedan's The Feminine Mystique.
This story has been difficult to write, both because 
of its size, that is, the wide-reaching connections hinted 
at above, and my own involvement and interest in the topic. 
To tell of my connections to this material, I must tell of 
my relationship to mathematics and to learning, much of 
which I learned in my home. Therefore, the stories of my 
parents, teachers, and peers, are equally part of this 
story that is only partially my own. Deciding how to 
present this story that is and is not mine is critical to 
the nature of meaning that it will spawn.
The writing of this story, this dissertation process, 
has woven itself into what is written. Though not always 
explicit in the text, the final form that it now takes is 
only one of many manifestations that it could have assumed. 
This seemingly singular writing has been shaped by and has 
shaped both the author and itself, emerging only in the 
acts of writing and reading. I have consciously approached 
the writing of this dissertation over the course of the
vi
(few) years since I started graduate school, but gender 
issues and mathematics learning have interested me since I 
first became aware of myself as a female and as a lover of 
mathematics. As a graduate student, these interests were 
nourished in my coursework, usually separately; that is, 
mathematics education in some courses and feminist theory 
in others. This dissertation is the result of my bringing 
them back together.
I cannot pretend that what follows presents "the 
truth," in the sense that such documents usually present 
themselves as replete with truth. That is not, to 
paraphrase Michel Foucault (1980), to say that truth is 
absent; this is merely a story that I, in my particularity, 
have fictioned on the basis of a political reality that 
makes it true.
Furthermore, I am conscious of attempting to make 
"familiar perceptions" about gender and mathematics "seem 
strange." This fiction-which-functions-in-truth 
(Walkerdine, 1990) raises troubling questions about the 
implicit assumptions of those perceptions and the 
consequences of research. This examination of perceptions 
and research will bring those assumptions to light, and 
will propose alternative assumptions, perceptions, and 
research agendas.
This story is not an attempt to provide and prove a 
seamless theory of the historical development of interest
in the mathematical development of women, a total history,
but a general history. A total history is one which "seeks
to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization . . .
the significance common to all the phenomena of a period,
the law that accounts for their cohesion" (Foucault, 1972,
p. 9); a general history seeks instead to
determine what form of relation may be 
legitimately described between . . . different
series; what vertical system they are capable of 
forming; what interplay of correlation and 
dominance exists between them; what may be the 
effect of shifts, different temporalities, and 
various rehandlings [of them]. (p. 10)
The citations included herein were selected from those
that were part of my own education and those that emerged
as significant in my reading and rereading of the
voluminous literature on gender and mathematics. I cannot
pretend that what follows is a comprehensive history of
this body of research, that all the questions that interest
me in this area have been suggested, or that all of the
"great works" have been included. Through the writing,
certain themes and authors emerged as significant to the
present work and these have been followed. This approach,
termed "phenomenological" in the work of Belenky (1986),
allowed for some of the presuppositions and frames-of-
reference in the literature, as well as in the present
work, to display their significance.
This is the story of many, but it is my story, too.
It represents only the beginning of my concerns with gender
and mathematics and schools. The only place to begin this 
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ABSTRACT
In the last two decades a tremendous volume of 
research data has been collected about differences between 
female and male students in mathematics. But although the 
volume of data has been large, there have been few 
conscious attempts to understand this data in social, 
economic, technological, and political terms. This history 
of academic research on gender differences connects the 
explosion of academic interest in the 1970s and 1980s with 
the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the sense of 
technological crisis that pervades mathematics education 
and popular consciousness. The emergence of "Women's Lib" 
and interest in gender equity in the 1960s and 1970s are 
also linked to the literature reviewed.
Fundamental to the discourse on gender differences is 
the notion of equal ability, which is studied through use 
of variables such as participation, attainment, or 
achievement. Although no explicit treatment is given to 
ability in the mathematics education literature, questions 
about the abilities of females are latent in the research. 
The aim of such research, it is argued, is to prove that 
the abilities of females are identical to those of males.
The author recommends that research questions be 
examined for hidden assumptions, primarily the assumption 
that females are not engaging in mathematical activity to
xii
the degree that men are. Assuming that women are 
mathematical leads to a different understanding of both the 
nature of difference and of mathematics, and raises 
numerous unanswered questions. For example, if women are 
mathematical, what is "women's mathematics"? This raises 
further questions about the nature of mathematical 
knowledge and mathematical certainty which are critical for 
the mathematics classroom. The role of intuition in 
mathematics is one critical classroom concept which is 
explored.
The goal of research on gender difference, the author 
maintains, should not be to force females to pursue 
mathematics to the same level as males, but to develop new 
windows for examining mathematics teaching and learning, 
and to improve mathematics education. This will have 
benefits for all students in mathematics, those who are 




Merleau-Ponty has reminded us that it is in a 
world already spoken that we speak. He 
understood that with every utterance we announce 
ourselves as members of human and historical 
communities. Our choices and expressions of 
meaning are connected to what has mattered in 
this world to the people who have cared for u s .
(Grumet, M., 1990, p. vii.)
See here how everything lead up to this day.
(The Grateful Dead, 1970)
I was born in 1964, as the Women's Movement was 
beginning to rise to the forefront of American culture.
The struggles of these women, their goals, failures, and 
successes, have formed the cultural background for my 
learning and living, leading inexorably to this day. In 
the words of Madeleine Grumet, I have been, and continue 
to be, spoken by it.
As a student, I have been spoken into being by the 
schools I have attended and the teachers I encountered 
there. As a teacher, I am spoken by my students even as I 
speak them.
In Exiles and Communities: Teaching in the
Patriarchal Wilderness, Jo Anne Pagano (1990) underscores 
the importance for feminists of understanding this 
cultural speaking. Because "oppressive practice depends 
on forms of expression organized oppositionally and
hierarchically -- presence-absence, intellect-emotion, 
public-private, self-other, objective-subjective, male- 
female" (xix), feminist practice refuses the organization, 
reconnects the oppositions to one another. Therefore, in 
education, it becomes crucial for teachers to question the 
separating of presence from absence in educational 
discourses, to endeavor to speak the absences. It is into 
precisely such an absence that I enter the discourse on 
gender differences in mathematics.
Questions about gender differences in mathematics 
stem from the oppositions and hierarchies about which 
Pagano writes. Our understanding of gender differences 
have broadened since Elizabeth Fennema (1974) conducted a 
reexamination of research data collected in the 1960s.
The questions she raised about such research inspired two 
decades of research designed to determine the nature and 
causes of gender differences, with the goal of developing 
the means to counteract the causes and so eliminate gender 
differences.
By concentrating on the inferiority of female 
learners of mathematics, Elizabeth Fennema (and those who 
have followed her) have contributed to the speaking of my 
absence. Unlike the female students in Fennema's studies, 
I have always enjoyed mathematics, have done well, and 
have been confident of my abilities. As a female from a 
working class home, my position in this discourse should
be that of the majority it seeks to explain and alter. It 
is not, and my positioning is that of the deviating 
deviant: I am made different from men by my gender and
different from women by my love of mathematics. I am 
divorced from mankind and from femalekind. This discourse 
silences me, forcing me into a tacit and ambiguous third 
category that is neither male nor female; it is from this 
feeling of "forced absenting" that my interest in gender 
differences in mathematics grows. In what follows here, a 
re-presentation of the presences spoken by the research, I 
am present, but only in the spaces. The stories and 
interrogations which follow are not merely academic 
exercises, but a search for myself as a learner, a 
teacher, and a person.
It is in the spirit of Pagano that I write this 
dissertation: It is a dialogue between myself and many
others. The first conversation is between me and my self; 
it tells of my coming to hold the conversations that 
follow, what has "lead up to this day." Like the others, 
it is on-going; continuing even as we confront this text.
The conversations that follow begin with my 
understanding of the problem we face -- we do not know our 
own story. By opening conversations with ourselves, our 
histories, our epistemologies, our world views, we begin 
to bring our story into view. By recognizing ourselves as 
participants in the continual construction of our story we
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position ourselves as directors of that story, ready to 
"write past, present, and future.
School
From the time I started school, I was a good student. 
I obeyed the rules set down by the teacher. I turned in 
completed homework assignments, mostly on time and mostly 
correct. I finished the sections on standardized tests 
with time to spare.
Like many children, learning to play the game of the 
school took me some time. Mrs. White, my first grade 
teacher, noted that I talked too much in class. Mrs. 
Thompson, in the second grade, noted that I did not use my 
time wisely and often turned in assignments late.
However, these were the only poor conduct notations on any 
report cards issued to me in school. By the third grade I 
was properly conditioned.
In those two years and the years that followed, I 
learned a great deal in school and about school. For the 
most part, my teachers, like most teachers, were competent 
and concerned, and I responded by learning the material 
that they had to teach, re-displaying it for them in 
assignments and on exams. Whereas in first and second 
grades my boredom had gone unchecked, as I realized the 
nature of the rewards and punishments inherent in the 
system of school and how rarely were the assigned tasks
truly difficult or the answers well-hidden, I learned to 
channel my boredom in acceptable ways. I discovered that 
reading was an acclaimed activity for free time; this 
activity allowed me temporary (mental if not physical) 
escape from the drudgery of school. Reading became to me 
what chocolate is to the long-term dieter: an exceptional
and highly anticipated reprieve from denial.
Throughout my schooling I was rewarded for my 
cooperation and my ability to perform well those things 
deemed important by my teachers. I was a "good" student 
in the eyes of the school, for I learned early to hide my 
boredom and modify my behavior in acceptable ways. It 
seems almost coincidental that the primary way I adopted 
was to read, and that this was not only acceptable in most 
cases, it reinforced my status as a good student.1
I was reading when I started to school; credit for 
this goes entirely to my mother. She began reading aloud 
to me as soon as I began to speak and understand words; as 
I grew older, reading was a central part of my life. I 
read absolutely anything and everything I could, at every 
possible moment. Perhaps my favorite reading material was 
the set of encyclopedias in my parents' bedroom.
xIt did this in two ways. First, it is to my 
voracious appetite for reading that I attribute much of my 
school-like learning, rather than to school directly. 
Secondly, reading is regarded as an intellectual activity 
that students often must be prodded into doing. By 
reading voluntarily 1 presented myself to my teachers as a 
superior student who was interested in learning.
Aside from the encouragement and stimulation I 
received at home, I gained insight into the possibilities 
for learning at a summer program for students identified 
as intellectually "gifted," the Governor's Program for 
Gifted Children. I was tested in 1976, in the sixth 
grade, along with my classmates; no one told us why we 
were tested. Several of us scored well enough to undergo 
further testing away from school; three of us exceeded the 
cutoff for admission to this program. Only I attended.
I returned to the McNeese State University campus in 
Lake Charles for four summers after the first one. It was 
as a result of that program that I first learned to paint 
stage sets and to grow plants from cuttings. In my 
summers there, I performed in five musicals and two plays, 
read 1984 and Waiting for Godot, and was introduced to 
symbolic logic and the philosophy of Descartes. I learned 
to play spades (well) and Risk (not so well), and to 
"appreciate" the songs of Tom Lehrer. I served as a 
Justice for the Student Court and, along with two others, 
decided several cases brought against students in the 
program. I washed my clothes, formed opinions and 
questions about the nature of law and justice, managed my 
time, and forged new and lasting relationships with other 
students interested in academic and other pursuits.
My participation in this program connected me with 
learning in ways that school had not. We learned by
reading, working, and discussing in the classrooms, 
laboratories, library, studios and theaters of the 
university. Unregulated by the demands of "regular 
school," the classes were designed primarily to stimulate 
interest rather than convey content. We were never given 
examinations; success was measured by the performance or 
painting or poem or story exhibited at the end of the 
summer for one another and our families. It was as a 
student in this program that I first began to see what 
learning and teaching could b e .
Family
My mother went to school in a small farming 
community. Married immediately after graduating from high 
school, she never returned to school. She does not 
consider herself well-educated or particularly intelligent 
(although I disagree) but has always insisted that I be 
both. Growing up in that small town in southwestern 
Arkansas, the granddaughter of the local Baptist minister, 
she learned as a young girl the importance of acting 
appropriately, of being concerned -- as all proper young 
ladies should -- with how others viewed her, what they 
thought of her. In her own way, she passed this legacy on 
to me but with significant changes.
My mother graduated from high school in 1941; I 
started school thirty-nine years later in 1970. In that
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time, women had made strides toward opening employment and
career opportunities that had been closed to them. My
mother anticipated the meaning of those changes for my
future, even though they had come too late for her.
However, her sensitivity to the scrutiny of others
never waned. In 1976, she applied for my admission to the
Governor's Program. It was extremely important to my
mother that I be admitted, more so than it was to me
initially. She was given a "Social History Worksheet" to
complete as part of the admission process. While her
answers to the questions are all strictly true, one of her
answers to the essay question is somewhat at odds with my
own memories. In answer to the question, "What kind of
adult person do you want your child to be?" she responded:
I want her to . . . make the most of her life in
whatever she chooses to be; whether it be a 
nurse, teacher, housewife or whatever. Like any 
mother I want the best for her. And if to her 
the best is to be a wife and mother then that's 
what I want. Or if it's to be a teacher then 
that's what I want. In other words what I 
really want is her to happy with herself.2
The occupations listed by my mother may not seem unusual
for a woman of fifty-three years writing in 1976; however,
this is a list significantly changed from the one that was
suggested to me. For me, it was the "whatever" that was
elaborated. I could, she told me again and again, be
2This is from a form that was completed by my mother 
in 1976; I found a copy, in her handwriting, in a box of 
school papers as I was writing this dissertation.
"whatever" I wanted to b e : a doctor, a lawyer, a 
scientist, or a "CPA, like cousin Joel," all of which I 
seriously considered at some time in my life.
No, it was not for me but for the scrutiny of others 
that this list was composed. Not daring to jeopardize my 
chances for admission to this program, my mother presented 
her wishes for me in what she saw as a more appropriate 
way, by providing a list of occupations that were 
"feminine" and "normal," and speaking the (preferred) 
absence by invoking "whatever." It is from her certainty 
about my capabilities and her consistent support that I 
attribute my confidence and success in schooling.
My father was also central to my schooling. Whereas 
Mother sparked my devotion to reading, Daddy contributed 
to my interest in mathematics, which is congruent with the 
results of research on parental influences on the success 
of females in mathematics (Franklin & Wong, 1987; 
Jayaratne, 1983; Morse & Handley, 1982; Schaalma, 1989; 
Wigfield, 1983; Yee, 1986). One particular memory 
involved negotiation between my father and me about 
computation and the algorithm that one uses, specifically 
the addition algorithm. I started school at a time when 
the ideas of New Math still held some sway over 
mathematics teaching and was required by my teachers to 
compute and to record my computations in a very specific 
manner. For my father, who was educated fifty years
10
earlier in a one-room rural schoolhouse, the laborious 
process of addition (and, in later years, the remaining 
operations) that was required of me was ridiculous. At 
the tender age of six, I found myself in the position of 
mediator between (at least) two different philosophies of 
education in mathematics.
My father worked as a clerk in the United States Air 
Force for twenty-two years and for the Arkansas Louisiana 
Gas Company for thirteen; computing quickly and accurately 
were fundamental to his job. Although he always had an 
adding machine on his desk, he trusted his ability to 
compute mentally, knowing that he could be just as 
accurate and faster. The mental skills that he had honed 
for years, however, were a hinderance in his attempts to 
help me to understand and perform in the manner that was 
required in school. Further, my own youth and 
inexperience left me without the necessary ability to 
mediate the dissonance created by his explanations and the 
dictated algorithms. A final obstacle to our 
communication was the perceived rigor of the algorithms -- 
no deviations or alternatives were allowed for school 
mathematics. How, my father inquired again and again, was 
one to master addition when one was forced to waste time 
recording needless steps in the process? The correct 
answer could be arranged by grouping and summing mentally.
Tied to this memory is my recollection of memorizing 
the multiplication tables. Each night, following the 
family meal, I recited the multiplication tables, 
beginning with "two times two is four." ("One times one 
is one" and the like held no interest for my father; the 
"one's tables" were obvious and required no memorization.) 
I recited the tables in order each evening, going out to 
play only after satisfactory competence had been 
demonstrated. My father did not cruelly deny me exercise 
and fresh air, he simply wished to ensure that I possessed 
basic knowledge without which he knew I could not be 
successful in mathematics; mathematics, he assured me, 
would be important to me in the future. He was also 
pleased by my ability in recalling these facts, for I 
mastered the lists quickly.
Neither of my parents attended college, but both 
insisted that my sister and I obtain at least one college 
degree. My interest in mathematics was fed by my father 
from an early age; my scholastic pursuits were constantly 
and consistently praised and supported by my mother. 
Together my parents gave me a determination to realize my 
educational goals and an affinity toward mathematics. In 
high school, when I was purportedly allowed to select my 
own path, I automatically chose "college prep" courses, 
emphasizing mathematics and science. Although I felt
12
drawn to numerous career paths, I knew that mathematics 
would be a central feature of any path that I chose.
University
I began my undergraduate work by majoring in chemical 
engineering. Once I started college and enrolled in a 
computer programming class, I felt that I had truly found 
my niche. I enjoyed (and continue to enjoy) exploring the 
power of the computer to calculate, summarize, organize, 
and output data. I was employed as a programmer in a 
program for college students for two summers by the 
company where my father had worked; in the intervening 
school year, I changed my major from computer science to 
accounting, a move prompted by a coworker who indicated 
that finding a programming position in a business might be 
easier with a degree in accounting and experience in 
programming. However, this experience in full-time 
programming revealed to me my need for personal contact; I 
knew that I could not spend my employed life facing a 
computer screen for eight hours with my back to the other 
people in the office.3
My final change of major from accounting to secondary 
mathematics education came soon after I acknowledged to 
myself that I did not want to program computers for the
3It seems somewhat odd to find myself doing precisely 
that as I write this dissertation.
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remainder of my life. I always had a denied, almost 
guilty, desire to teach, which I acknowledged at this 
time. Like most students in education, I was actively 
deterred from that course by my parents, friends, and 
teachers. I made the conscious choice at that time to 
ignore the warnings and follow my own path, focusing on my 
love of mathematics and my desire to inspire and challenge 
others mathematically.
Feminism
Before beginning graduate studies, I considered 
myself "liberated" in the popular sense. That is, I was 
concerned about equal pay and access to jobs and 
promotions. I insisted that housework and child care were 
equally the responsibility of men and women, particularly 
when both spouses are employed outside the home, and was 
(am) an outspoken proponent of choice. These attitudes 
were cultivated by the early encouragement to be 
independent given me by my mother; she had herself lived a 
very traditional life: two children, no employment
outside the home. However, she seemed able to intuit the 
changes that were in coming for women in the 1970s; her 
age4 had separated her, not me, from those changes.
Limited by the financial and cultural restrictions imposed
4My parents were roughly the age of my peers' 
grandparents when I was born; my father was 50, and my 
mother was 41.
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on women in the 193 0s and 4 0s, my mother fashioned her 
life within her boundaries; her understanding of women's 
rights and the new boundaries, as passed to me, rejected 
any notion of gender restrictions on intellectual growth.
Although I was committed to many of the ideals that I 
now realize can properly be called feminist, I actively 
denied that I was, indeed, a feminist. When I was in high 
school, with Ronald Reagan beginning his eight-year tenure 
in the White House and conservatism the accepted political 
stance, feminism implied burning bras, drafting women and 
using unisex restrooms in public areas.5 I was unaware of 
a multiplicity of feminisms, or that feminists could 
differ so markedly in their interpretations of what 
constitutes feminist thought and action. I had yet to 
understand how much of what I desired for myself, and many 
things that I took for granted, were a result of feminist 
struggles both before and during my lifetime.
My first semester of full-time graduate work offered 
me the opportunity to investigate feminist theory, in the 
form of a course. New insights into the debates within 
and between feminisms, coupled with my personal commitment 
to mathematics education, sparked the interest in current 
research developed here. What kinds of feminist 
understandings and assumptions are inscribed in the
5It never bothered me, or even occurred to me, that 
this is precisely what the bathroom in my house was.
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various strands of research in mathematics education? How 
do feminists with different theoretical stances view the 
common notion that women are not mathematical? The 
distinctions drawn by Alison Jaggar in Feminist Politics 
and Human Nature (1983) between liberal feminism, 
traditional Marxism, radical feminism, and socialist 
feminism remain central to the development of my curiosity 
about gender and mathematics education. Jaggar's 
exposition of the philosophical understanding of human 
nature that is implicit in each of these categories, as 
well as their political implications, provoked my 
interest. That interest has led me to explore the tacit 
beliefs about the nature of human beings, learning, 
rationality, individuals, and mathematics that underpin 
research in mathematics education and gender as well as my 
own understandings of my place within that research.
As I moved from teaching mathematics to teaching 
mathematics teachers, I began to wonder why I was so 
different. That I was different became increasingly 
clear; as I probed the literature in mathematics education 
and differences in gender, the sense of aloneness that I 
had first experienced in elementary school began to grow. 
Where was I to locate myself and my experiences in a field 
which presented girls as poor mathematics students? Where 
were my male classmates, who detested mathematics and who
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opted out at the first opportunity? Why did (does) this 
research insult me so?
This work, then, in part represents my quest for 
myself -- and other women -- in this body of literature.
It is fueled by my ever-increasing joy in mathematics, in 
being mathematical, my desire to share that joy, and my 
commitment to my belief that all of us possess at least 
the potential to be mathematical. It also represents my 
continuing effort to understand all forms of feminism and 
to understand and articulate my own feminist philosophy.
Recent scholarly interest in gender differences and 
mathematics learning surfaced in a femininst climate 
dominated by the ideals of liberalism. In order to reveal 
the shape of current work, it is necessary to look briefly 
to the beginnings of the feminist movement for the origins 
of current questions in mathematics education and gender. 
An understanding of the origins of the questions currently 
dominating the field is critical to a feminist analysis of 
the research.
But the roots of recent research extend farther than 
the feminist movement of the past twenty years. Questions 
of gender and mathematics cannot be extricated from the 
sense of emergency that has pervaded mathematics education 
since the launch of Sputnik in 1957. Confronted with a 
national crisis, the American public latched on to 
mathematics and science education as the key to military
and economic security, a hope which continues to dominant 
the educational landscape. The push to increase the ranks 
of scientists in this country sparked increases in 
mathematics courses and enrollments. This continuing 
campaign and the emergence of feminism in the popular 
arena form the cultural milieu in which research in 
mathematics education and gender are entangled: Any
understanding of the current research cannot be attempted 
without a brief survey of the larger picture.
This look to history begins in chapter 2 with a 
review of literature on gender differences in mathematics. 
Although gender is not necessarily primary or separate as 
a body of experience, the research on gender differences 
has, for the most part, investigated the relationship 
between gender and mathematics learning separately from 
other cultural groups; because the present work is a 
general examination of literature, understandings of 
gender frame this writing. This body of work is then re­
framed within the national response to the crisis of 
Sputnik in chapter 3. Chapter 4 returns to the issue of 
gender and mathematics education, but rejects the 
criterion of a masculine norm against which the 
accomplishments of females are to be measured and raises 
questions about the definition of mathematics and 
mathematical knowing assumed in difference research. The 
way in which "mathematics" is understood has had profound
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effects on the study of gender differences, which assumes 
that mathematics as legitimated and understood by men is 
the only mathematics which exists. In the final chapter,
I conclude by suggesting alternative ways of understanding 
the nature of gender in mathematics learning, the 
mathematics classroom, and by proposing a research agenda 
that complements this understanding.
CHAPTER 2
US OR THEM:
LOCATING AND REDUCING DIFFERENCES
In those languages that assign gender to words, 
the word mathematics is feminine, but 
mathematician, meaning the studier or doer of 
mathematics, is masculine. Herein lies the crux 
of the mathematical mystique. Is the world of 
mathematicians truly a masculine domain, into 
which women must venture with caution and 
trepidation? Are women who have entered it more 
"masculine" than other women? In what ways do 
females differ from males with respect to 
mathematical achievement and ability? To what 
extent can these differences be attributed to 
the self-fulfilling prophesy and socialization 
experiences at home and in school that reinforce 
the mathematical mystique? What research 
evidence suggests ways to remediate the results 
of or prevent the avoidance of the study of 
mathematics and careers in which high-level 
mathematics skills are required? (Fox, 1980a, 
p.l)
Women are deficient in Reason but abundant in 
Emotion, [and] they ought [not] be treated as 
rational. . . . Behind their backs they are
both regarded and spoken of by all except the 
very young -- as being little better than 
"mindless organisms." (Abbott, 1884/1952, pp. 
49-50)
In the decade that followed the re-emergence of 
feminism in the United States, the spotlight of feminist 
scrutiny grew wider and brighter, encompassing more and 
more aspects of life in the United States.1 A few women
1Clearly, a statement like this one blatantly ignores 
the critiques of minority women that mainstream feminism 
has largely ignored their needs and interests, 
concentrating exclusively on the problems of white, middle
19
20
began by probing the gendered nature of housework 
(Freidan, 1963) and the airline industry (Davis, 1990); 
their rage at the sexism they uncovered opened the 
floodgates to the surge that has been termed the "second 
wave" of American feminism.
This problematic label is used to distinguish the 
most recent period of feminist activity, beginning in the 
1960s, from the struggle for women's suffrage in the early 
part of this century. This usage, however, serves to 
perpetuate a false impression of feminist inactivity 
between the two periods and functions to divide and 
disempower women. As a "new generation" finds itself 
facing a backlash from the religious and political right, 
younger feminists are now members of the "third wave," a 
label which deprives them of the centuries-old history of 
feminist struggle. Separating feminism into "waves" is a 
way of fracturing the efforts of women across age and 
across time that "erases our ancient, multiracial, cross- 
cultural history and limits our constituency" by asking 
veteran feminists to "pass the torch" (Morgan, 1993, p. 1) 
to a younger generation. Although the usage is prevalent 
in the literature, I will not adopt it here. In fact,
class women. While I do not wish to perpetuate this 
attitude of exclusion, mainstream first generation research 
in mathematics education has also been largely race- and 
class-blind. Therefore, I have focused this chapter on 
recent feminist activity as it has most directly influenced 
the bulk of research in mathematics education.
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this dissertation represents, among other things, an 
attempt to write against the grain of feminist waves, to 
re-introduce a general frame of our history as women and 
men, and as teachers, learners, and doers of mathematics.
This historical background does not attempt to 
provide and prove a seamless theory of the historical 
development of interest in the mathematical development of 
women; it is not a total history, but a general history.
As Foucault (1972) points out, a total history is one 
which "seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a 
civilization . . . [to reveal] the significance common to
all the phenomena of a period, [and to prove] the law that 
accounts for their cohesion" (p. 9). A general history 
seeks to
determine what form of relation may be 
legitimately described between . . . different
series; what vertical system they are capable of 
forming; what interplay of correlation and 
dominance exists between them; what may be the 
effect of shifts, different temporalities, and 
various rehandlings [of them]. (p. 10)
Rather than demonstrating a cause-and-effeet relationship
between the historical events described, this chapter will
provide a view of the complex networks of interlocking
events that served as the stage upon which the drama of
women's participation in mathematics education has been
examined.
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The Burgeoning of the Women's Movement
As the struggle for suffrage ended in the early years 
of this century, the feminist movement in the United 
States divided over the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), with 
one side demanding absolute equality under law and the 
opposition resisting the abolition of labor laws that 
protected women. The rift in the feminist movement 
centered around two conflicting views of women: equality
proponents saw women as basically similar to men, and 
supporters of protection for women viewed them as more 
vulnerable, "doubly burdened as they often were by job and 
motherhood" (Davis, 1991, p. 32) .
This rift resurfaced in the conflicts between liberal 
feminism and women's liberation in the 1960s. Committed 
to reform, liberal feminists concentrated their efforts 
"on opening up the male world to women at all levels" (p. 
68), and focused attention on legal and cultural barriers 
to the success of individual women. The women's 
liberation movement was an offshoot and occasional 
competitor of liberal feminism, and "women's libbers" were 
generally younger, more radical, and were veterans of the 
civil rights and peace movements. Although the efforts 
of these women were instrumental in opening feminist 
discourses to the voices of poor and minority women, in 
the early 1970s liberal feminism became the mainstay of
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the struggle "almost by default" (p. 137), as most of the
original women's liberation groups died out.2
The resurgence of the feminist movement in the United
States cannot be traced to a single event or a single area
of life. It followed on the heels of the civil rights and
peace movements, but these are not its only roots. It
began, too, in the battles between airline stewardesses
and airlines over age and marriage restrictions, and in
the demands of women for equal access to elite, male-only
institutions of higher education (Davis, 1991).
Additionally, women who had influence in Washington, D.C.
contributed their efforts to ensure basic legal rights for
women. And others challenged the doctor's office,
exposing sexism in medical treatment for women
(Mendelsohn, 1981; Roberts, 1981; Scully, 1980).
Historian William Chafe (1972) highlights the dominance of
liberal feminism in his description of feminist efforts:
Female activists picketed the Miss America 
contest, stormed meetings of professional 
associations to demand equal employment 
opportunities, and forced their way into male 
bars and restaurants in New York. They called a 
national strike, wrote about the oppression of a 
"sexual politics," and sat in at editorial 
offices of Newsweek and Ladies Home Journal. [3]
2For simplicity, "feminism" will be used for the time 
being to describe the efforts of the mainstream, that is, 
liberal feminism; the implications, problematics, and 
critiques of liberalism are addressed in chapter 3.
3They did not, however, burn any bras. At the Miss 
America pageant protest, "protestors crowned a live sheep 
Miss America . . . [and] tossed curlers, girdles, high-
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At times, it seemed that the media had been 
taken over by women's liberation, so often did 
female activists appear on network television 
and in national magazines. In an era punctuated 
by protest, feminism had once again come into 
its own. If not all women subscribed to the new 
fight for equality, an energetic minority 
nevertheless believed that the time had come to 
finish the task of gaining for women the same 
rights that men had. (pp. 226-227; italics 
added)
In a few years, the movement had exploded onto the 
cultural scene. Flora Davis (19 91) notes that "people 
spoke of 'sexism' and 'male chauvinism'" (p. 16), and "in 
the early 1970s, feminists set out to change American 
education . . .  at every level from kindergarten through 
graduate school, from the content of textbooks to the way 
colleges hired faculty" (p. 204). The efforts of 
feminists were widely distributed: some fought to gain
knowledge about and control over medical treatment (The 
Boston Women's Health Book Collective, 1976, 1992;
Roberts, 1981) ; others filled in gaps in history (Alic, 
1982; Lerder, 1977, 1979; Levin, 1980; Lopate, 1968; 
Lutzker, 1969). Feminists objected to the sexist 
presentation of women in textbooks and other school 
materials (Council on Interracial Books for Children,
1977; Davis, 1991; Downer, 1982) and discussed how to rear
heeled shoes, women's magazines, and the odd brassiere into 
a 'freedom trash can'. . . .  No one lit a match to the 
trash can -- America's most famous bonfire was strictly a 
media invention" (Davis, 1991, p. 107).
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children in nonsexist ways (Greenberg, 1978; Pogrebin,
1980).
Interest in the education of women emerged early in
the crusade for equality. In 1962, the Itasca Conference
on the Continuing Education of Women convened in Itasca
State Park, Minnesota. At the end of the conference,
Margaret Culkin Banning (1963) concluded:
We are certain that the need and desire for 
continuing education of American women is not 
regional but national. . . . The fires of
interest have sprung up in noncontiguous areas 
and have not been started by one hand. The 
roots of the movement seem to be in the unused 
or undeveloped abilities of women and the 
conscientious belief of women, educators, and 
citizens that we are permitting a waste of 
ability that we cannot afford, (p. 143)
Within a few years, the "fires of interest" were raging
widely and wildly, leaving permanent marks on the face of
education in the United States.
In the 1970s and 80s, interest in the relationship
between education and gender blossomed. Women discussed
the ways in which schooling contributed to gender
oppression (Deem, 1980; Epstein, 1970; Frazier & Sadker,
1973; Grambs & Waetjen, 1975; Maccoby, 1966; Maccoby &
Jacklin, 1974; O'Kelly, 1980). They rejected the male
bias of traditional history and began exploring women's
history (Baum, 1986; Chafe, 1972, 1977; Dick, 1981;
Grinstein & Campbell, 1987; Higonnet, Jensen, Michel, &
Weitz, 1987; Janssen-Jurreil, 1982; Kennedy, 1983; Lerder,
1977, 1979; Osen, 1974; Perl, 1978; Stein, 1985).
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Feminists exposed the barriers to and problems for women 
in professions like engineering (Hacker, 1982, 1983) and 
medicine (Beshiri, 1969; Lopate, 1968; Lorber, 1984; 
Mendelsohn, 1981; Muff, 1982; Scully, 1980; Walsh, 1977). 
Recognizing mathematical training and ability as a 
critical filter (Sells, 1973) in obtaining employment in 
heretofore "male" domains like medicine and engineering, 
feminists began to examine the simple explanations for 
female underachievement and underparticipation in 
mathematics.
It is not surprising that as women investigated the 
ways in which society operated to direct the current of 
female life in particular ways that attention turned to 
examining the role of education. In general, these 
activities divided along two paths: (1) exploring and
challenging the mechanisms by which the intellectual 
activities of women were directed towards "feminine" 
fields, like nursing or education, and away from 
"masculine" fields, like engineering or law; and (2) 
investigating the basis for differences between the 
achievements (usually defined by occupational choice) of 
females and males.
As one of the few experiences that is common to all,
the process of schooling was and continues to be an area
of interest to feminists. Although the relationship of
gender to learning has been explored and theorized for
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millennia, feminists sought to undermine prevailing 
opinions regarding the possibilities for the education of 
women. In the three decades that have followed the 
reemergence of feminism, various facets of education have 
been examined to determine how understandings of gender 
are related to schooling. Although this work continues in 
all the disciplines represented in schools, it is the 
investigation into mathematics and science that is of 
particular concern here.
In 1974, Elizabeth Fennema4 directed this energy 
toward mathematics education, probing the relatively small 
body of relevant literature produced in the previous 
decade to determine to what degree the belief that boys 
learn mathematics better than girls was supported by 
research. Finding insufficient evidence to confirm this 
belief, particularly at higher grade levels, Fennema and 
others continued this investigation in subsequent studies 
(Fennema and Carpenter, 1981a, 1981b; Fennema and Sherman, 
1977, 1978; Fennema, Wolleat, Pedro, and Becker, 1981; 
Sherman and Fennema, 1977). One significant result of 
these and other, similar studies was an increasing
4Elizabeth Fennema clearly was not the first or only 
researcher to publish in the area of mathematics and 
gender; however, given the importance of her work, and the 
volumes of research that she and various colleagues have 
produced, she is commonly given credit for following a 
sounder research program than her predecessors and for 
stimulating greater interest and research in the field.
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awareness of the complexity of the relationship between 
gender and mathematics learning.
This research, and much that has followed, is typical 
of first generation feminism (Noddings, 1990b), in that it 
seeks an understanding of how females differ from males, 
where masculinity is accepted as the norm; in work of this 
type, femininity gets defined, albeit not explicitly, as 
deviant in relation to this masculine norm (Gilligan,
1982). Although numerous insights into the relationship 
of gender to learning mathematics have been gained from 
first generation work, critiques of "male as norm" have 
led feminist researchers to the second generation. Before 
turning our attention to critiques of the first generation 
and the work of the second, however, a deeper 
consideration of the understandings gained from first 
generation investigations is warranted.
An Old Question
Questions about the different natures and abilities 
of women and men have occupied the interest of 
philosophers and scholars for generations. Dominated by 
males, philosophical discourses on sex-linked differences 
have historically centered on the ability of women to 
conceive and bear children, have assumed masculinity as 
the norm from which women deviate, and have sought to
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articulate the nature and effects of that deviation 
(Agonito, 1977) .
Specifically, interest in sex-linked differences in 
learning mathematics preceded the explosion of research 
effort in this area following the reemergence of feminism 
in the United States. In the period from the mid-1950s to 
the early 1970s, researchers in mathematics education 
expressed concern with why "Johnny" could not add (Fang, 
1968). Common wisdom of the time stated that, while 
Johnny could not read either, mathematics was "his" 
strength whereas language was the strong subject for Jane. 
Maccoby (1966; also, Maccoby and Jacklin, 1974) concluded 
from the literature on sex differences that, although 
there was no clear indication that either sex was 
generally more intelligent than the other, there was 
sufficient empirical evidence to support the belief that 
girls have superior verbal ability and, in the long term, 
inferior abilities in arithmetic reasoning, spatial 
ability, and in the ability to restructure problems 
creatively.
This conclusion was supported by the data collected 
for Project TALENT, a large-scale testing effort designed 
to identify talented high school students (in the spirit 
of post-Sputnik concerns). Project TALENT researchers 
tested hundreds of thousands of high school seniors in 
1960, and included interest and attitudinal inventories in
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addition to the battery of academic tests, which focused 
primarily on mathematical, scientific, and technical 
aptitudes. Like previous research on sex differences, the 
Project TALENT data indicated that, among high school-aged 
students, boys were much more likely than girls to have 
interests and abilities in quantitative and/or scientific 
areas.5
The bulk of such research in the 1950s and 1960s 
seems to have been less directed at ways to increase the 
mathematical abilities of young women than in determining 
appropriate expectations of students based on gender. For 
example, a study reported in Journal of Educational 
Psychology (Sommer, 1958) compared the ability of women to 
men in remembering quantitative information embedded in a 
paragraph. Sommer's results suggested that women were not 
as capable as men as recalling quantitative information 
from paragraphs, but these same women demonstrated ability 
equal to that of the men in recalling decontextualized 
numbers of six or seven digits.
Sommer concluded that this may indicate that "many 
women are unable to retain large numbers (thousands or 
millions)" (p. 191), in spite of his own research data. 
Clearly, the women were able to retain numbers in the
5Wise, Steel, and MacDonald (1979) found that 
differences in the number of mathematics courses taken by 
female and male students accounted for virtually all the 
discrepancies reported in the Project TALENT data.
millions, for they recalled the decontextualized six- and 
seven-digit numbers at the same rate as the men in the 
study. The problem with the recall of the women seems not 
necessarily to be in remembering the numbers themselves 
(as Sommer concluded) but may well stem more from the 
contexts in which the numbers were presented. For 
instance, it may be easier to recall a seven-digit number 
presented without context if one likens it to a phone 
number. However, when the same number is presented as the 
population of Bombay or as the number of barrels of oil 
shipped from Venezuela each month, the lack of familiarity 
or interest in the presented material, or other 
distractions of context, may account for observed 
discrepancies.6
Sommer's study is mentioned here to illustrate7 that 
gender research in mathematics education prior to the 
early 1970s was not limited merely to broad statements of 
male superiority in mathematics and science. Some effort 
was expended to determine which gender excelled in
6It is interesting to note that the type of error 
Sommer highlights is one of significant places; i.e., 
writing 12,000 for 120,000 or 1,016,000 for 116,000. It 
has been suggested (Paulos, 1988; 1991) that most people 
have difficulty interpreting and remembering large numbers, 
due in large part to a general lack of understanding of 
differences in the magnitudes of large quantities.
7The studies cited here are representative of research 
of the period; see Fennema's (1974) seminal summary of 
major research in mathematics education and gender 
conducted in the 1960s for other examples.
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specifically conceived areas of mathematics (arithmetic, 
problem solving, spatial reasoning). However, the reports 
of research on gender differences that was conducted in 
the 1950s and 1960s do have the flavor of sexism. In 
other words, the interests of the researchers seemed to 
lie more in maintaining the inferiority of female 
mathematics students than in investigating the roots of 
difference.
Two examples will clarify this point. The first is a 
longitudinal study of changes in intelligence test scores 
during college and how those changes related to gender.
The researchers expected to find that college males gained 
more than college females, based on research that 
suggested that females "average slightly higher than boys 
until at least the age of 16" (Charles & Pritchard, 1959, 
p. 43). But the males in the study made no significant 
improvement in their scores during this time whereas the 
females did. Nevertheless, Charles and Pritchard conclude 
that "the equalization of the sexes in ability must occur 
in middle to late adolescence" (p.44), the period of time 
separating the two periods under consideration.
Finally, in a study of sex differences in class rank 
at the high school level, Arwood Northby (1958) found 
twice as many females as males in the top 20% of the 
sample, and significantly more males in the bottom 20% of 
the same sample. The importance of this data, Northby
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maintains, is to point to a problem in college admissions: 
"If rank alone is used for selection to coeducational 
colleges, the character of these institutions obviously 
would change markedly" (p. 64) .
Each of these studies reveals an implicit goal of the 
researchers of thie period: to "uncover" the "truth"
about female inferiority in mathematics. Such studies 
present "evidence" gathered in the effort to support the 
conclusion which has already been established. When the 
data fail to support the desired conclusion, some factor 
outside the scope of the study is invoked to explain the 
failure; clearly, the conclusion cannot doubted. To do so 
is to risk some marked change in the character of academic 
and other institutions by allowing women full access to 
them.
A New Look
What feminist researchers were able to introduce into 
the field was a greater skepticism about prevailing 
beliefs regarding the nature, extent, foundations and 
implications of those differences. For example, prior to 
the groundbreaking work of Elizabeth Fennema (1974), 
researchers had reported primarily on differences in 
ability in mathematics (Poffenberger and Norton, 1959; 
Riffenburgh, 1960; Stinson and Morrison, 1959); few 
studies compared differences in achievement (Aiken and
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Dreger, 1961). Fennema's work was instrumental in 
shifting the attention of researchers to achievement, a 
variable more readily measured and addressed than ability 
(Crockett & Petersen, 1984).
In 1974, Fennema's seminal paper, "Mathematics 
Learning and the Sexes: A Review" appeared in the Journal
for Research in Mathematics Education; this publication 
launched three decades (and counting) of research on 
gender differences in learning mathematics. This paper 
not only revealed that most studies conducted after 196 0 
did not clearly establish the existence of differences 
between the sexes, but, perhaps more importantly, raised 
troubling questions about the conclusions that were 
reached in these studies, that differences existed and 
favored boys. In her re-examination of this body of 
research literature, Fennema made generally accepted 
answers regarding both the nature and direction of gender 
differences less acceptable, opening mathematics education 
to the floodwaters of feminist research.
There is no indication in the literature that these 
early researchers had been deliberately misleading in the 
presentation and analysis of data, including those whose 
conclusions were subsequently rejected. Rather, in 
retrospect, it seems that the belief that males have 
higher ability in mathematics was so pervasive that 
researchers simply sought evidence to show when and where
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differences appeared. In the face of less-than-clear 
data, then, these researchers could have been led by the 
strength of their beliefs, and the lack of a reasonable 
challenge to those beliefs, to conclusions not fully 
supported by the data.
Fennema's challenge to accepted wisdom was soon 
picked up by other researchers. In 1979, Wise, Steel, and 
Macdonald re-examined the conclusions derived from the 
Project TALENT data collected in 1959 and 1960; they 
showed that all of the differences attributed to gender in 
the original analysis disappeared when the number of 
mathematics courses taken was controlled. It was not 
surprising that women as a group performed at a level 
below males as a group because females had been compared 
with males who had taken as much as six semesters more 
mathematics. When the analysis was adjusted to compare 
groups with similar course-taking behaviors, the 
differences disappeared (Wise, Steel, & MacDonald, 1979).
But the questions that Fennema's initial paper 
inspired went beyond mere re-examinations of old data. 
Prior to her work, researchers had assumed (believed) that 
differences in achievement and interest in mathematics 
were due to some sex-linked difference in ability; as 
researchers began to question that assumption (Crockett & 
Petersen, 1984), and cast doubt upon the data used to
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support that claim, other questions began to arise and new 
research was conducted.
The Biological Basis8 of Inferiority: Moving Backwards in
Time
The argument that women's inferiority is rooted in 
biological differences is one of the most ancient of 
philosophical discourses, and justifications for its 
acceptance have fluctuated throughout the ages. Plato and 
Aristotle held opposing views on the inferiority of the 
female, with Aristotle advancing the position that woman's 
inferior biology renders her inferior mentally and 
spiritually (Agonito, 1977). Although the status that 
variations of this argument have enjoyed has waxed and 
waned through the ages and cultures of Western history, it 
has never truly disappeared from the discourse on gender.
Although Plato himself disavowed the notion that the 
biology of gender determines the differences between women 
and men, his version of a social order based on 
"inherited, inborn distinctions" (Gould, 1981, p. 20), the 
"metal" of which different classes are made, ultimately 
contributed to the birth of scientific investigations into 
the biological bases of differences in races, sexes, and
8I have summarized and compressed the arguments 
surrounding biological determinism, but interested readers 
should see Sayers, J., (1982), Biological Politics:
Feminist and Anti-feminist Perspectives, London:
Tavistock, for an excellent treatment of the history and 
problematics of biological determinism.
classes of human beings. In his historical analysis of 
the science of differences, Stephen Jay Gould (1981) 
traces the evolution of biological determinism, the 
argument that inequities in the social order are the 
natural and accurate reflections of inherent biological 
differences. Proceeding from this premise, determinists 
have used various (and often spurious) means to locate the 
origin of differences within the human body.
Considering the relationship between social gender 
and biological sex continues to raises difficult 
problematics for feminist theorists (Malson, O'Barr, 
Westphal-Wihl & Wyer, 1989; Sayers, 1982); biological 
determinism can be invoked in liberatory, as well as 
oppressive, situations. While biological differences have 
often been used as the basis for discriminatory practices, 
they may also serve to privilege women's positioning, 
particularly with respect to child-rearing and mothering; 
that women are much more likely than men to be awarded 
child custody by the courts is an example of biology-as- 
privilege. The tension between biology-as-privilege and 
biology-as-handicap has been explored in the work of 
numerous feminist writers (Jaggar, 1983; Sayers, 1982); it 
is the notion of biology-as-handicap which troubles 
research on sex-related differences in mathematics 
learning.
Most often, deterministic arguments have centered on 
the ability of the female to menstruate, conceive, and 
lactate. These biological processes have forever bound 
woman, at least as far as (male) philosophers and 
theorists have been concerned, to the process of 
procreating the species, and thus to sentimentality and 
nurturance. The importance of such processes cannot be 
challenged; the perpetuation of humanity depends upon 
these capabilities and the willingness of women to engage 
in them. According to adherents of biological 
determinism, the need for procreation is so fundamental 
that nothing can be allowed to interfere, including the 
development of individual intellect (Gould, 1981). 
Nevertheless, however critical procreative functions may 
be, feminists argue, women must not be bound only to this 
activity. Not merely demeaning to women, this mentality 
deprives all humanity of the intellectual, social, 
political and professional contributions that women can 
make.
The importance of procreative functions has been used 
to exclude women from educational experiences (because of 
our "natural" positioning as emotional rather than 
rational persons) and further used to stimulate fears that 
female scholarship could lead to sterility (Sayers, 1982). 
The uterus was now no longer invoked as the location of 
differences within the body for craniometry relocated
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differences in intellectual ability in the brain (Gould,
1981). Although advances and changes in craniometric 
understandings led to the abandonment of the study of the 
physical size and shape of the brain, some researchers 
continue to hope that an immutable physical difference can 
be shown to limit the intellectual potential of one of the 
sexes.
The notion that differences in the number of women 
and men who pursue higher-level mathematics is due to some 
fundamental biological difference is a compelling one for 
many theorists. In the search for evidence that biology 
determines intellectual ability, researchers have looked 
to genetics, to the levels of sex hormones in the body 
(both before and after birth), and to the structure of the 
brain for answers. In a review of the literature,
Crockett and Petersen (1984) concluded that sex-linked 
differences in cognitive abilities cannot be explained by 
genetic factors, and that the data available on 
connections between the levels of estrogen and androgen 
produced in the body and sex-related differences in 
mathematical achievement are "largely inconclusive" (p.
98). Nevertheless, Thomas Hoben (1984) proposed a theory 
which assumes that a recessive gene linked to the X- 
chromosome facilitates high mathematics performance. This 
theory, in his estimation, explains the differences in 
scores for high-achieving junior high school students on
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the mathematics portion of the SAT; Hoben's tenacity and 
temerity, in light of the contradictory and insubstantial 
nature of the data, are characteristic of determinist 
writers.
In addition to the levels of sex hormones and the 
impact of genetics on mathematics learning, determinists 
have looked to differences in brain structure to explain 
differences in mathematics performance. There is some 
evidence that the brains of females are less lateralized 
than those of males (Crockett & Petersen, 1984) although 
differences in lateralization are not always found and are 
not always found in the same direction (Bleier, 1984) . 
Brain lateralization refers to the degree to which the 
hemispheres of the brain operate independently of one 
another. In general, though differences in lateralization 
do not always appear in a specific brain, the brains of 
women display greater interconnection between hemispheres, 
which has led some researchers to conclude that women 
process information in both hemispheres to a greater 
degree than men (Bleier, 1984).
Although it may be the case that the brains of women 
and men differ in ways that are germane to mathematics 
education, too little is known about how the brain 
functions to draw any firm conclusions. Crockett and 
Petersen (1984) note that the brains of females and males 
are much more alike than different, and that it is
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impossible to disentangle biological factors from cultural
factors when conducting research on the human brain. In
her scathing critique of sex differences research that
looks to the brain for answers, Ruth Bleier (1984)
concludes that
studies linking hormones with . . . achievement
and intelligence or linking "innate" differences 
in brain structure with sex differences in 
verbal, mathematical, and visuospatial abilities 
have been methodologically, logically and 
conceptually unsound and inconclusive. (p. 108)
Bleier notes that researchers in this area start with "the
very questionable assumption" (p. 92) that sex-linked
differences occur, then look to brain lateralization,
hormonal levels, or genes for differences to support the
assumption. Bleier concludes her critique by referring to
differences in socialization, ignored by determinists, and
points to a hidden agenda in this research. She says:
The enormous differences in socialization 
factors are more than adequate to explain the 
almost trivial differences that exist in mean 
scores without speculating about the 
differential evolution of female and male 
brains, of which nothing is known. . . . What
the studies are in fact trying to explain are 
the more widespread differences that exist 
between the sexes in status, privilege, or power 
within known industrial, patriarchal systems, 
and they do this through attempting to 
scientifically establish biologically 
determined, sex-differentiated cognitive and 
personality characteristics that would make 
women's subordinate position inevitable. (p.
109)
Although the specter of biological determinism 
continues to hang over research on sex-related differences
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in mathematics education, most researchers in the field 
have turned to other, more exp'lorable and tenable factors 
to explain observed differences in achievement, factors 
which allow the possibility for equal participation of 
women in mathematics. It is to this mainstream of 
research, which has rejected biological determinism in 
favor of other theories, that we now turn.
If Women Are Not Inherently Inferior, Then Why Is 
Mathematics So Male? and Other Questions
As studies emerged that confounded the belief that 
males possess superior ability in learning mathematics, 
researchers were confronted with indisputable evidence 
that women were less likely to enter fields that are 
highly mathematical. If, as researchers were concluding, 
women are not inherently less able in mathematics, why are 
women less likely to enter mathematical9 fields than men? 
For answers, many researchers turned to the process of 
course selection in high school and college, looking for 
differences in the amount and kind of encouragement and 
information given to students of both genders by school 
personnel, parents, and peers (Armstrong, 1985; Brody & 
Fox, 198 0; Franklin & Wong, 1987; Grambs & Waetjen, 1975;
9The use of "mathematical" or "mathematics-related" to 
describe scientific and technological occupations or 
college majors is both common and disturbing. I have 
adopted the convention for ease of understanding and 
readability here, but it is a revealing convention that is 
analyzed below.
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Jayaratne, 1983; Luchins & Luchins, 1980; Morse & Handley, 
1982; Schaalma, 1989; Stallings, 1985; Wigfield, 1983;
Yee, 1986).
What these investigations reveal is not surprising. 
Researchers found that the counselling students receive 
about course selection varied by gender, with males 
receiving greater encouragement in mathematics and science 
(Astin and Snyder, 1984). They pointed to the absence of 
strong female role models, both in schools and in 
textbooks, as contributing to the common perception of 
mathematics as a male domain (J. Ernest, 1976; Luchins and 
Luchins, 1980), as well as to textual depictions of women 
as mathematically inept (Tobias, 1978). Like previous 
studies, each of these helped to illuminate the complex 
social processes which shape the aspirations of females 
and males in schools and in society.
Questions about the discrepancy between the number of 
women and men pursuing mathematics-related careers were of 
no small importance, for researchers had found 
overwhelming evidence to support the notion that 
mathematics functions as a critical filter in the 
employment choices of women (Sells, 1973, 1980; Tobias, 
1978). Opting out of mathematics courses in high school 
places limits on future decisions that are difficult to 
overcome. These future decisions involve both admission 
to selective colleges and graduate programs, and admission
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to specific programs within universities that require 
higher mathematics. Fennema (1984) conceded that "adult 
differences in mathematics-related careers cannot be 
totally traced to differences in course taking" (p. 140) 
in high school, but the exclusion of women from highly 
mathematical fields continues to contribute to women's 
high rate of poverty (American Association of University 
Women, 1992).
Although questions regarding the amount and type of 
encouragement given to young women by counselors, 
teachers, and parents continued to be of concern, other 
researchers looked to differential treatment within the 
classroom to explain differential participation patterns. 
Eccles, et al. (1985), in a study of the effect of
teaching style on gender differentiation in mathematics 
performance, found no significant correlations between 
"teacher-style variables" (p. 114) and student attitudes 
toward learning mathematics. In a review of the 
literature on teacher effects, Lockheed (1984) concluded 
that a small group learning environment is more conducive 
to gender equity than teacher-centered whole group 
learning.10 In a recent recapitulation of findings in
10Th.is finding is the most common; however, in a study 
of cooperative learning in mathematics, writing and reading 
in third, fourth, and fifth grade classrooms, Glassman 
(1988) did not find any differences between cooperative 
classes and traditional classes on achievement, gender or 
race relations, or student attitudes.
teacher-student research, Leder (1990a) noted that 
"research has indicated that teachers often interact 
differently with their male and female students, with 
males attracting more and qualitatively different 
interactions" (p. 17). The relationship between teacher 
behavior and student achievement has been widely studied 
both in education generally and in mathematics education 
in particular (Becker, 1981; Brophy, 1985; Brophy & Good, 
1974; Brunson, 1983; Butler, 1989; Eccles & Blumenfeld, 
1985; Fennema, Reyes, Perl, Konsin, & Drakenberg, 1980; 
Glassman, 1988; Hart, 1990; Macfarlane & Crawford, 1985; 
McDermott, 1983; Peterson & Fennema, 1985; Sangster, 1988; 
Sangster & Crawford, 1986; Stanic & Reyes, 1986; Walden & 
Walkerdine, 1985). The findings of these studies have 
yielded no consistent conclusions regarding the 
relationships between teacher-student interaction 
patterns, or coeducational versus single-sex schooling, 
and gender differences in mathematics.
Differential treatment of female and male students by 
teachers of mathematics is of particular concern in that 
this often unwitting behavior could have detrimental 
effects on the attitudes of females toward learning 
mathematics. The relationship of mathematical disposition 
to performance and retention in mathematics courses has 
implications beyond gender (Bassarear, 1986; Bretscher, 
1989; Hart & Stanic, 1989; Randhawa, 1989), but
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researchers of the first generation have closely 
scrutinized data on mathematical disposition for clues to 
explaining recorded differences in performance by females 
and males in mathematics classes (Biaggio & Pelofski,
1984; Blum-Anderson, 1989; Coladarci & Lancaster, 1989; 
Handel, 1986; Jayaratne, 1987; McConeghy, 1985, 1987).
Three themes emerge from a reading of the literature 
on attitudes and gender differences in achievement and 
participation in mathematics. First, students who express 
a positive attitude toward their own abilities in 
mathematics [confidence] are more likely to continue in 
mathematics courses. Second, the perception of 
mathematics as useful or needed for future success 
[usefulness] is critical to the continuation of 
mathematical study. Finally, the positive influence of 
significant others, whether teachers, parents, or peers, 
is necessary to maintain the desire to pursue mathematics 
at increasingly higher levels and, for females, to 
overcome feelings of being "unfeminine" [sex-role 
congruency] (Armstrong 1985; Meyer & Koehler, 1990).
How girls and boys differ in their attitudes towards 
mathematics, and towards themselves as learners of 
mathematics, has received significant attention in the 
literature on gender differences. In a study of high- 
achieving students enrolled in AP Calculus courses, 
Casserly (1980) found that girls cited the encouragement
of other high-achieving females as the most significant 
influence on their decisions to pursue mathematical study. 
Eccles, et a l . (1985) found attitude was affected more
often and more strongly by grade than by gender, and that 
time in school, coupled with grade history, had a negative 
effect on attitude toward learning mathematics for 
students of both genders. However, in the same study, 
boys were more likely than girls to report that 
mathematics is not too difficult, rated their own ability 
higher, claimed to exert less effort, had greater 
expectations of success, and were more likely to consider 
mathematics useful; these findings are consistent with 
other research (Fennema & Sherman, 1977, 1978; Joffe & 
Foxman, 1986; Shuard, 1986). It is significant, however, 
that girls typically underrate their success, and do 
better than they expect, while boys typically overrate 
their success, and do more poorly than expected (Joffe & 
Foxman, 1986) . This discrepancy demonstrates both 
differences in girls' and boys' understandings of sex- 
appropriate responses and the problems inherent in drawing 
conclusions from self-reported data.
In an early study of the relationship between 
attitude and performance, Fennema and Sherman (1977) found 
that controlling for various affective measures eliminated 
sex-related differences in mathematics achievement. 
Likewise, controlling for future intent, that is, the
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intention to enroll in mathematics courses in the future,
eliminated sex-related differences in achievement. Fox,
Brody, and Tobin (1985), in a study of mathematically able
students, found that
boys and girls . . . are more alike than
different with respect to attitudes and 
interests. It appears that the younger 
generation of mathematically gifted girls have 
more positive perceptions of the importance of 
studying mathematics than past generation of 
gifted girls, (p. 274)
In a study encompassing a wide range of grade levels, from
elementary school to college, John Ernest (1976) reported
no sex-related differences in claims to like mathematics
at any grade level; mathematics was the only subject
studied for which no sex-related differences were found.
Four subjects were considered in Ernest's study:
mathematics, English/reading, science and social studies.
Girls reported liking English more than boys, and boys
selected science, and to a lesser degree social studies,
as a favored subject more often than girls. These
findings cast doubt on the power of attitudinal
differences to explain differences in the performance of
girls and boys in mathematics, although the importance of
a positive attitude toward mathematics for success in
learning cannot be discounted.
One sex-related difference in attitude which has been
noted in various studies is attribution of
success/failure, that is, the reason students give for
good/poor performance on mathematical tasks. Four 
attributions are possible, ability, effort, task 
difficulty and luck; they are categorized as internal 
[ability and effort] and external [task difficulty and 
luck] or as stable [ability and task difficulty] and 
unstable [effort and luck] (Meyer & Koehler, 1990). It is 
commonly accepted that females are more likely to 
attribute success to effort and males to attribute success 
to ability (Fennema, 1985; Fennema, Wolleat, and Pedro, 
1979; Gitelson, Petersen, & Tobin-Richards, 1982; 
Kloosterman, 1990; Koehler, 1990; Leder, 1984; Meyer and 
Koehler, 1990; Pedro, Wolleat, Fennema, & Becker, 1981; 
Wolleat, Pedro, Becker, & Fennema, 1980).
In a related study of the mathematical attitudes of 
college mathematics teachers, Taylor (1990) reported that 
success in mathematics was most often attributed to effort 
rather than ability. While the differences between the 
college teachers and school-aged students preclude direct 
comparisons, it is interesting to note that an attribution 
generally invoked in the academic literature as hindering 
the future participation of female high school students, 
success due to effort rather than ability, is articulated 
by individuals who have, by some measure at least, risen 
to the top levels of mathematical attainment. While these 
professors of mathematics were able to concede high 
ability to colleagues they, like Sir Isaac Newton, found
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the roots of their own success in "persistence and hard 
work" (p. 56), components of effort.
The notion that success in mathematics is due to 
effort on the part of the learner stems, at least in part, 
from early schooling experiences. The traditional 
curriculum, with its focus on computational competence, 
emphasizes this aspect of mathematics over others; during 
this time in school, the mathematical performance of girls 
is generally found to be equal to or slightly better than 
that of boys, particularly in computation. Shuard (1986) 
states that "the majority of primary teachers [privilege] 
the skills of computation, at which more girls do well"
(p. 34) over other skills, such as problem solving, at 
which more boys excel. Walden and Walkerdine (1986) argue 
that early identification with the teacher, and acceptance 
of the teacher's values, allows for girls to adopt 
positions of relative power in the classroom, as "sub- 
teacher. "
By being positioned like the teacher and sharing 
her authority, girls are enabled to be both 
feminine and clever; it gives them considerable 
kudos and helps their attainment. (p. 125)
In later grades, as the emphasis on computation decreases
and the ability to "break set," or step outside the
accepted rules, becomes more important, the performance of
girls begins to fall behind that of boys.
To challenge the rules of mathematics discourse 
[which is often necessary in solving complex 
mathematical problems] is to challenge the
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authority of the teacher. . . .  If there are 
considerable pressures specifically on girls to 
behave well and responsibly, and to work hard, 
it may well prove more than they can bear to 
break rules. . . . Our analysis leads to the
conclusion that there are problems for girls, 
but not of the order of a fundamental or 
essential lack of ability, or of missing out on 
a natural sequence of correct development 
towards cognitive maturity. Rather, social and 
psychic relations coalesce to produce 
possibilities, positions and constraints which 
both allow and prevent certain forms of 
behaviour and of thinking. (pp. 126-127)
The conclusion that school experiences favor the
mathematical achievement of boys over that of girls due to
preferential treatment by teachers is certainly open to
suspicion. Eccles, et al. (1985) found that the majority
of teachers play a passive role in the socialization
processes of their female and male students in relation to
mathematics. Likewise, Shuard (1986) compared the content
of test items for which a significant gender difference
was demonstrated to the content of mathematics lessons:
The questions at which girls did better were 
more emphasized in the work which the children 
do in class. . . . The hypothesis that the
primary mathematics curriculum favours boys does 
not seem to be well supported by this evidence.
. . . It would be mischievous to suggest that
pupils who pay attention to the teacher's 
traditional emphases in primary mathematics give 
themselves a positive disadvantage for future 
success in mathematics, but the evidence seems 
to point in this direction.11 (p. 31)
i:LThis quotation points to a further problem for 
research in mathematics education: the break between 
elementary and secondary teaching. Occurring at about the 
same time that gender differences emerge, this break in the 
curriculum is manifested by a shift from concrete and 
procedural to abstract and relational and to be successful
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Shuard's analysis of the gendered nature of schooling
highlights the complexity of relationships and
interactions in classrooms between students, teachers, and
curricula, a complexity which continues to perplex
researchers in the field. Ethington (1992) points to the
problems and dangers of this research:
The patterns of influences seen through this 
[research] . . . emphasize the complexity of
psychological influences on achievement 
outcomes. Influences are not always direct and 
readily apparent. (p. 18 0)
The difficulties that must be faced in determining the
direction and degree of teacher impact on mathematical
attitude are further complicated by social stereotyping of
mathematics as a male domain (Boswell, 1985; Eccles, et
al. , 1985; Fennema & Sherman, 1977; Grambs & Waetjen,
1975; Leder, 1986; Northam, 1986).
This difficulty is analogous to that faced by those
seeking an unchanging biological basis for sex-related
differences in mathematics, namely, disentangling cultural
influences outside school from those within school.
Researchers have acknowledged that they ignore broader
cultural impacts on the mathematics classroom and they
admit the underlying assumption: that mathematical
attitudes are developed primarily in the mathematics
students must be able to make this break as well. By 
listening well (and being positioned as sub-teacher) in the 
elementary school classroom, there is some evidence that 
girls are less able than boys to effect this switch on 
entering secondary school.
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classroom (Fennema, 1990). The implications of this 
assumption are explored below.
Defining Equity in Mathematics Education
As interest grew and the number of studies increased 
and the complexity of the problem was grasped more fully, 
one central question emerged early in the 1980s. Defining 
equity in relation to mathematics education was and is 
seen as critical in determining a proper course of action 
for its achievement, for how one defines equity will 
determines acceptable routes to achieving a equitable 
mathematics education for students of both genders. If 
there are no significant differences in the ability of 
females and males to learn mathematics, then the education 
of girls and boys should be identical. If, however, basic 
differences exist then the education that students receive 
must be adapted to meet those gender differences if equity 
is to be attained.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, numerous variables 
were introduced in an effort to explain and alter patterns 
of course-taking and occupational choice that divided 
along gender lines. Researchers examined the influence of 
parents on the mathematical achievement of girls and boys, 
looked at how patterns of achievement varied with age, and 
examined differences in the classroom interactions of 
girls and boys (including the effects of competitive and
cooperative environments on the achievement of gender 
groups) as well as noting affective differences, and 
differences in attributions of success and failure. 
Research teams found that girls received less attention 
from teachers in mathematics classes; they are asked fewer 
questions, and a smaller percentage of those questions 
that are asked call for higher-level thinking. Girls are 
less likely than boys to receive either praise or 
criticism for their mathematical work, and what praise is 
given most often reflects standards of neatness or 
evidence of hard work (Fennema & Peterson, 1987).
But the central goal which drives this research is 
not the mere articulation of the nature and extent of sex- 
linked differences. The fundamental force that drives 
this research is the need to direct, shape, and control 
educational experiences so that females attain and achieve 
at the same levels as males. Elizabeth Fennema (1990) 
gives three definitions of equity that may be used to 
determine whether or not equity has been attained for 
females and males in mathematics education. The first, 
equal opportunity, is based on whether girls have the same 
opportunity to pursue mathematics as boys. Since course 
placements are not overtly determined by gender in the 
United States, equal opportunity, in its crudest sense, 
has been achieved. However, as Fennema argues, available 
data on actual patterns of course selection show a "clear
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difference by sex" (p. 3), which leads her to conclude 
that equality of opportunity is not a sufficient 
indication that equity has been achieved. Although equal 
opportunity is clearly a first step on the road to equity, 
alone it cannot ensure equity.
The second definition of equity, equal treatment, 
would require that all students be treated identically in 
the classroom. Research has documented differential 
patterns of treatment for female and male students in 
mathematics classrooms, but the relationship between 
teacher treatment, student achievement, and gender-related 
differences is unclear. As Fennema (1990) notes, "many 
writers have inferred or even stated that if this 
differential treatment were eliminated, then equity in 
mathematics education would be achieved" (p. 4), either 
because they see equal treatment as a desirable outcome in 
itself, or because they believe that equal treatment would 
eliminate gender-related differences in achievement. 
However, Fennema rejects equal treatment as the criterion 
for evaluating equity because of the uncertainty of its 
relationship to student achievement and to gender. 
Selecting equal treatment as the criterion for determining 
if equity has been achieved assumes that females and males 
will respond identically to identical educational 
experiences (as well as assuming that identical treatment
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is possible), an assumption researchers have been 
unwilling to make, in light of evidence to the contrary.
The final definition, equal outcomes, measures the 
degree to which equity has been attained in mathematics 
education by the difference in "the attainment of 
important educational outcomes" (p. 4) for females and 
males. If this definition is used, then clearly equity 
has not been achieved in mathematics education, for girls 
and women take less mathematics, report less confidence in 
their mathematical abilities, do not see mathematics as 
useful to the degree that boys and men do, and are less 
likely to enter mathematics-related occupations.
The goal of equal outcomes has been selected by 
Fennema over equal opportunity and equal treatment as the 
only choice that can rectify significant differences 
between females and males should they exist. This 
insistence on equal outcomes for females and males has led 
researchers to focus on the mathematics classroom and its 
impact on society, a one-way analysis of the relationship. 
Since the actions and attitudes of social actors are not 
containable or controllable, and those of school personnel 
presumably are, the discourse has centered on impacting 
outcomes by designing and implementing appropriate 
interventions for the classroom to bring about equity for 
females.
The selection of equal outcomes as the criterion for 
determining if equity has been achieved, unlike equal 
opportunity or equal treatment, allows for the possibility 
of sex-linked differences in mathematical ability and the 
means for addressing those differences. Although the 
notion that males are inherently superior in mathematics 
is given little credence by most researchers, males seem 
to perform better on many tasks that are deemed visuo- 
spatial in nature.12 The relationship between such 
abilities as mentally rotating, folding, and completing 
figures to mathematical ability and achievement is at best 
ambiguous, as is the relationship between observed 
differences in performance and inherent biological 
differences. But the selection of equal outcomes as the 
fundamental goal provides teachers and researchers with 
theoretical and practical avenues to redress any 
fundamental sex-linked differences, should they exist, in 
the classroom.
We Gotta Do Something! Designing Intervention Strategies 
for Mathematics Classrooms
Even as researchers argue about the definitions of 
equity and the criteria for determining if equity for 
females has been achieved, the way in which these
12For the most part, such "tasks" are quite contrived, 
and there is no consensus that they actually measure what 
is termed "visual-spatialization" ability.
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questions are framed has profound implications for all 
research of the first generation. By limiting their 
studies to the classroom, these researchers are forced to 
locate both the problems and the solutions of sex-related 
differences in mathematics in schools. While classroom- 
based research has contributed substantially to 
understandings of gender, this narrow focus severely 
hampers the efforts of researchers to attain equity.
While researchers admit that gender-related 
differences in learning mathematics are certainly 
influenced by the attitudes and beliefs of the wider 
society, the assumption that the classroom is the location 
of virtually all mathematics learning, and of 
socialization toward mathematics, underpins the research 
of the first generation. Chipman and Thomas (1985) 
underscore this belief: "Rarely is mathematical knowledge
acquired anywhere else" (p. 275); for the most part, 
researchers agree and extend this statement to include not 
only mathematical knowledge, but mathematical attitudes as 
well. This assumption is necessitated by the definition 
of equity as equal outcomes; the only location accessible 
to direct control is the classroom.
In the last two decades, numerous intervention 
strategies have been designed, implemented, and evaluated 
in light of their success in changing the patterns of 
women's and girls' participation and achievement in
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mathematics. The faith that these researchers place in 
classroom intervention is grounded in the belief that 
educators have the power to change schools, and thus 
society, and to bring about equity (Fennema, 1981, 1984) .
A wide variety of interventions programs have been 
developed and tested, with many different specific foci 
for change. Many studies have pointed to the need for 
providing students with career information in junior and 
senior high school that points to the need for mathematics 
courses (Armstrong, 1985; Brody & Fox, 198 0; Brush, 1985; 
Eccles, et al., 1985; Sells, 1980; Stallings, 1985; Tobin 
& Fox, 1980), and providing similar information to parents 
and other significant adults (Brush, 1985; Fennema, et 
al., 1981; Sells, 1980; Stallings, 1985). Other studies 
have highlighted the need for female role models (Brody & 
Fox, 1980; Stallings, 1985), for changing the atmosphere 
of the classroom so that female students are more 
comfortable (Armstrong, 1985; Burton & Townsend, 1986; 
MacDonald, 1980; Brush, 1985; Stallings, 1985), or 
altering the context or content of instruction to make 
mathematics more "girl-friendly" (Burton & Townsend, 1986; 
Eccles, et al., 1985). Finally, other researchers have 
recommended that attitudes toward mathematics be an 
explicit part of classroom discussions (Burton & Townsend, 
1986; Fennema, et al., 1981) or that all students be
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required to take four years of mathematics in high school 
(Brush, 1985).
The successful intervention is fundamental to the 
project of these researchers. By actually changing the 
achievement and participation patterns of females to match 
those of males, researchers hope to establish firmly that 
the abilities of women are equal to those of men.
Although rejected as a research variable, questions 
regarding ability are latent in this work. Explicitly, 
the question of ability has been dismissed; in light of 
the lack of accepted evidence of inherent difference in 
ability, researchers have correctly (in my view) abandoned 
biological determinism for other, more tenable, theories. 
But implicitly, for many, there remains the fear that such 
a difference may be found to exist. Achievement, then, 
becomes more than an alternative variable, easier to 
research, but the vehicle for confirming equal ability.
The central goal of these interventions, then, is not 
to achieve equality for women, but to prove equality of 
women. In 1980, researchers Camilla Benbow and Julian 
Stanley argued that it is differential ability that 
produces differential achievement. Published in Science 
in December 1980, "Sex Differences in Mathematical 
Ability: Fact or Artifact?" was widely-read; the
conclusions of the authors regarding differences of 
ability reinforced female inferiority in the minds of the
citizenry.13 But research conclusions do not necessarily 
have to match those of Benbow and Stanley to reinforce 
this notion generally. Although academics are careful to 
avoid discussions of ability, those not associated with 
research procedures may focus on the implicit nature of 
the research project. Indeed, they may wonder, why would 
so much time, money, and expertise be expended to 
establish equal ability in mathematics via changes in 
participation and achievement if there were no reason to 
suspect that ability varies by gender? Likewise, the 
recent media popularization of the report of the American 
Association of University Women (1992), How Schools 
Shortchange Girls, serves to entrench the notion that 
females are inferior in mathematics and science. Although 
the contents of the document do not suggest any inherent 
deficiency, the reduction of the report in the media to a 
brief statement may suggest to the nonacademic that girls 
are in need of more intensive attention to rectify some 
"natural" inability.
While I have no desire to suggest that interventions 
or difference research are responsible for commonly-held 
attitudes regarding the abilities of females in 
mathematics, there is cause for concern that such
13The relationship between the public image of 
mathematics, the scholar's image of mathematics, and gender 
will be explored in chapter 4.
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investigations contribute to the continuation and
entrenchment of these attitudes.
It may be that the very vigor of this research 
activity has given rise to . . . the new
mythology: that is, [that] males and females
are basically different in cognitive and 
psychological makeup. (Burton, 1981, p. 106)
The history of mathematics is rich with specific examples
of women's ability, but it is also permeated with the
notion of the general mathematical inability of women. We
must caution ourselves against assisting the survival of
this out-dated notion, even though our intentions may be
directed at its demise.
The primary difficulty with intervention is the
implied use of force to attain equal outcomes.
Intervention strategies are developed with the explicit
intent of shaping the choices of young women to conform
more closely with the definition of equity selected by the
researcher. The process of intervention, then, becomes a
way to control women by controlling their educational and
occupational choices. One of the forces motivating this
desire to control will be explored in the next chapter.
First generation feminists have made significant
strides forward and have contributed a wealth of
information to understanding the nature and extent of
differences between females and males in learning
mathematics in a short period of time. However, the
problematic assumptions inherent in this work must be
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addressed if the goal of equity for all students of 
mathematics is to be realized.
The work of these researchers has focussed on 
comparisons of females to a masculine norm and, in the 
liberal tradition, have set equal outcomes between females 
and males as the fundamental aim of mathematics education. 
But more is involved than merely changing the educational 
and occupational choices of women; to gain an 
understanding of this, it is necessary to step further 




THE ENGENDERING OF TECHNOLOGY
The ultimate objective is to raise technology to 
its proper place within the context of early 
American history. It belongs very close to the 
center as an expression and a fulfillment of the 
American experience. (Hindle, 1966, p. 28)
For the better part of its cultural life, the 
United States has been idealized as the land of 
practicality, the land of know-how, the land of 
Yankee ingenuity. No country on earth has been 
so much in the sway of the technological order 
or so proud of its involvement in it. Doctors 
and engineers are central to our culture; poets 
and artists live on the fringes.
If practicality and know-how and 
willingness to get your hands dirty down there 
with the least of them are signatures of the 
true American, then we have been systematically 
training slightly more than half of our 
population to be un-American. . . .  We have 
trained our women to opt out of the 
technological order as much as we have trained 
our men to opt into it. (Cowen, 1979/1991, p. 
302)
The concept of progress acts as a protective 
mechanism to shield us from the terrors of the 
future. (Herbert, 1965, p. 316)
What matters most is the aspiration to live in 
balance with nature, "walk lightly on the land," 
treat the earth as a mother. No surprise that 
to such a morality most industrial processes, 
work schedules, and products are suspect! Who 
would use an earth-mover on his own mother? 
(Callenbach, 1975, p. 32)
The launch of Sputnik I, the first artificial Earth- 
orbiting satellite, helped to initiate a crisis in
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mathematics and science education from which these fields 
have yet to fully emerge. The launch extended popular 
perception of the scope of the Communist threat beyond 
nuclear attack to our technological obsolescence; 
increasing the level of participation of students in 
mathematics and science education came forth as the 
popular solution.
One consequence of the Soviet launch was the 
beginning of a long parade of widely-touted reform 
movements in mathematics education designed to increase 
participation, perhaps the most dubious of which was new 
math. New math was succeeded by other reform efforts, 
most recently that presented by Curriculum and Evaluation 
Standards for School Mathematics (National Council of 
Teachers of Mathematics [NCTM], 1989) and Professional 
Teaching Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM, 1991d). 
Each of these reform efforts has presented (and continues 
to present) meeting the challenges of the technological 
crisis as a preeminent problem of mathematics education.
The historical sketch of reform in mathematics 
education presented here is designed to provide a 
framework to examine the widespread interest and ambiguous 
intent that has developed around gender differences in 
mathematics learning discussed in the previous chapter. 
This historical grounding is critical, for not only has 
this period marked a dramatic increase in concern over
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education in general, and mathematics education in 
particular, it also has seen the re-emergence of the 
feminist movement, and widespread popular and academic 
interest in questions of gender, class, and race. The 
intersection of these two events, the technological crisis 
and the women's movement, sparked the development of 
interest in the field of gender and mathematics education 
to the degree that the relevant literature has become an 
almost unintelligible mountain of words -- contradictory 
and confusing.
The view presented in this section will assist in our 
understanding of how the current questions in mathematics 
and gender have been influenced, both presently and 
historically, by educational and cultural fears about 
technological obsolescence. Much of the effort expended 
toward developing gender-equitable mathematics education 
stems not from a desire to overcome oppression or to be 
egalitarian but from a cultural need to remain on the 
cutting edge of technology. It is assumed that this need 
can be met only by increasing the body1 of mathematicians 
and scientists devoted to maintaining our technological 
position in the world. In this century, the United States 
has emerged as the preeminent technological power, partly
xThe use of this word is ironic in that women, 
historically identified with the body as opposed to the 
intellect, have been appropriated as the protectors of 
America's technological future.
in response to the dire insult to our national pride dealt 
by the Soviet launch in 1957; our sense of being, as 
defined by government, corporate and intellectual leaders, 
is based on the belief in power through technological 
superiority. The discourse of "superiority in-and-by 
technology" is grounded in the same discourse that looks 
for the basis of female inferiority in mathematics. That 
the path to gender equity in mathematics is found by many 
in technological involvement is both significant and 
disturbing.
This chapter examines the relationship between 
society, technology, and gender. "The belief in the 
inevitability of progress and of progress precisely as 
technological progress" (Segal, 1985, p. 1) has been a 
defining feature of the culture of the United States since 
its creation, and a feature of American utopianism since 
the late 1800s. David Orr (1992) notes that "any decent 
philosophy of technology will be a political philosophy 
that clarifies the effects of technology on the 
distribution of power and control in society" (p. 40; 
italics added). Therefore, such a philosophy of 
technology must address itself to a critical understanding 
of gender. As a challenge to the prevailing attitudes of 
Americans who are "technological somnambulists wandering 
through an extended dream" (Winner, 1986, p. 169), I will 
look to the concerns of feminists and other theorists
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regarding gender bias in the history of technological 
development, and to the gendered nature of technology 
itself.
This investigation will allow a re-presentation of 
technology and technological education as a gendered and 
engendering construct that raises difficult problematics 
for those interested in gender-equitable mathematics 
education. I conclude that in our refusal to ask 
ourselves these difficult, and perhaps unanswerable, 
questions about mathematics and gender, and in our 
compliance with the demands of business and industry for 
technological advances, we have relinquished control over 
our research; we have allowed the needs and desires of 
technological progress to determine our research agenda 
and, thereby, our conclusions.
Although much of this chapter will focus on problems 
and critiques of the technological mindset so 
characteristic of American culture, this is not to be 
interpreted as a rejection of technology. To do so, as I 
type this into the memory of my computer, would be 
profoundly hypocritical. Rather, I am addressing the 
"ideology of technological society" (Rothman, 1989, p. 49) 
with its "consistent theme . . .  of order, productivity, 
rationality and control" (p. 52) that provides 
"mechanical/industrial metaphors for everything (p. 49).
The Technological Roots of the United States
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The promise of advancement through technology has 
been a prominent part of the American consciousness since 
the American Revolution. Developments in printing and in 
the manufacturing of weapons were central to the victory 
over the British Empire; many of the "founding fathers," 
most notably Franklin, Jefferson, and Washington, were 
committed to "ushering in a new scientific and 
technological era . . . [that] would help to free the
people of young America from economic subjugation to 
Europe" (Oliver, 1956, p. 104). Thomas Jefferson in 
particular grounded his hopes for the promotion of the 
general welfare in the promises of science and technology.
In the years that followed, technological innovations 
and the abundant resources of the new country contributed 
to the feeling that "the nation could create and sustain 
virtually limitless growth" (Marcus and Segal, 1989, p.
52); historian of technology Brooke Handle (1966) states 
that technology has been "an expression and a fulfillment 
of the American experience" (p. 28) throughout our 
history. Unlike some Europeans of this era, Americans 
generally did not engage in widespread protest or exhibit 
great concern about the introduction of machinery into 
industry, but welcomed it instead as "the one thing 
needful to furnish the freedom and leisure necessary for
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intellectual exercises" (Walker, 1831 [cited in Marcus &
Segal, 1989, p. 84]).
In his commentary on America, Alexis de Tocqueville
(1840/1945) surveyed the place of technology in the common
consciousness:
In minds thus predisposed [to technological 
innovation], every new method that leads by a 
shorter route to wealth, every machine that
spares labor, every instrument that diminishes
the cost of production, every discovery that 
facilitates pleasures or augments them, seems to 
be the grandest effort of the human intellect.
(p. 45)
Such faith is not uncommon in the United States. Our 
current commitment to technology can be traced back, at 
least in part, to the innovations of Industrial Europe 
(Segal, 1985), and, in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, utopian theories and reform movements alike 
converged on the power of technology to ease burdens and 
eliminate want. Although unable to test their theories 
about building a utopian society, the writings of a small 
group of technological Utopians were "widely and warmly 
received" in a culture partial to "the gospel of progress 
and of progress as technological progress" (Segal, 1985,
p. 102). Although not long-lived as a philosophical and
social movement, the technological Utopians contribute 
significantly to contemporary attitudes toward the 
benefits of technological innovation, increasing our 
collective faith in the power of technology as a positive 
social force.
In the years that followed, technology became more 
firmly entrenched in the American consciousness as 
innovations emerged in the fields of transportation, 
agriculture, communication, energy, entertainment, warfare 
and in the home. The end result was the rise of the 
United States to the status of world power, based 
primarily on the industrial power developed in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the outbreak 
of war in Europe in 1917 (Oliver, 1956). Throughout the 
history of the United States "technology has been an 
integral facet of American experience" (Marcus & Segal, 
1989, p. 361). While the specific technologies themselves 
have evolved, disappeared or come into being, the promise 
of a better life through technological advancements and 
the faith of the American people in that promise has 
grown.
Sputnik and the Emergence of Crisis
At the end of World War II, the United States basked 
in the glow of a decisive win and, in the decades that 
followed, Americans continued to accustom themselves to 
the luxuries, necessities, and inevitabilities of 
technological innovation. Magazine pages of the late 
1950s and early 1960s were filled with advertisements 
extolling the latest products; the "good citizens" 
depicted in these ads installed the newest home technology
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to make life easier, built bomb shelters to make life 
safer, and traded for current model-year automobiles to 
keep up with the pace of modern life.
But the confidence of Americans in the technological 
superiority of the United States suffered a stinging blow 
on October 4, 1957, when the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics launched Sputnik I, and the world entered the 
Space Age with the Bear in the lead.2 As Magyar (1961) 
said:
Ever since the Russians launched their Sputnik, 
gloom has descended on the American Horizon.
Public opinion, aroused by this event, found a 
ready answer to the complaint that we had failed 
to train enough scientists and technicians. The 
fundamental cause of our suddenly discovered 
inferiority was . . . our educational system.
(p. 293)
Already concerned with a lack of "manpower" in scientific 
and technological arenas (Cooper, 1985a, p. 128), the 
countries of the West stepped up efforts to reform 
mathematics and science education. Both this concern and 
the activity that followed were intensified by the 
public's fear of Communism and fueled by the release, at 
least in the United States, of massive public funds for 
reform (Moon, 1986; Kliebard, 1987). The express 
scientific and technological purposes behind this release
2The launch of Sputnik I was followed one month later 
by the launch of Sputnik II, which carried a dog into 
space. Another month later, an attempt to launch a 
American satellite failed.
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of funds were revealed in the first paragraph of the
National Defense Education Act of 1958:
The Congress hereby finds and declares that the 
security of the Nation requires the fullest 
development of the mental resources and 
technical skills of its young men and women.
The present emergency demands that additional 
and more adequate educational opportunities be 
made available. The defense of this Nation 
depends upon the mastery of modern techniques 
developed from complex scientific principles. 
(Kliebard, 1987, p. 266)
Prior to Sputnik, mathematics educators in the United 
States had already been engaged in developing programs to 
meet "the needs of society [and] . . . the needs and
characteristics of the pupil" (Kinney and Purdy, 1952, p. 
31). Following passage of the National Defense Education 
Act in 1958, the majority of programs benefitting from the 
largess of Congress were focused on "modern" mathematics, 
or "new math." Arguing that the mathematics currently 
taught in school "hadn't changed in the last 300 years" 
(Sharp, 1964, p. 11), reformers in mathematics education 
escalated their efforts to reshape the content of the 
mathematics curriculum to reflect the growth that had 
occurred in mathematical knowledge. This modern 
curriculum, it was believed, would allow students to meet 
the needs of a constantly changing, technological world.
In his history of curriculum, Herbert Kliebard (1987) 
emphasizes that these reform efforts were not controlled 
by the education community, but by the mathematicians and
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scientists who were the recipients of the bulk of newly-
available federal funds. He writes:
Almost without exception, the directors of these 
major [curriculum revision] projects were drawn 
from academic departments in major universities. 
Control of curriculum change . . . had reverted
from its traditional locus in the professional 
education community to specialists in the 
academic disciplines. . . . The longstanding
emphasis on local efforts at curriculum change 
was replaced by a pattern of centrally 
controlled curriculum revision. . . . The
process of curriculum change [became] one in 
which the curriculum would be developed first by 
experts at a center set up for that purpose with 
the local school systems perceived as consumers 
of external initiatives. (p. 268)
Concern about technological progress and the loss of world
preeminence following Sputnik supported the efforts of
academic specialists to gain control over curriculum
revision. To quote Kliebard (1987):
Life adjustment education was already in steep 
decline when . . . Sputnik . . . was launched by
the Soviet Union. . . . Quickly, life
adjustment education was seen as the prime 
example of America's "soft" education in 
contrast to the rigorous Soviet system. While 
American schoolchildren were learning how to get 
along with their peers or how to bake a cherry 
pie, so the explanation went, Soviet children 
were being steeped in the hard sciences and 
mathematics needed to win the technological race 
that had become the centerpiece of the Cold War.
(pp. 264-265)
One result of the end of life adjustment education was a 
re-entrenchment of the academic subjects as the basic 
components of education, and a fostering of distrust of 
educators who had given the country a weak and ineffective 
education system.
The "technological race" that Kliebard mentions did 
not end with the launch of Sputnik; rather, the launch of 
Sputnik can be seen as the herald of technological marvels 
to come. The success of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics reminded the United States that the competition 
for preeminence did not have a guaranteed outcome: 
complete dedication to innovation was needed if the United 
States was to emerge the victor. It became a matter 
central to national pride that the first person to set 
foot on the moon be a citizen of the United States.
Great emphasis was placed on the education of the 
"best and brightest" students during this period. Hyman 
G. Rickover, Vice Admiral of the U. S. Navy, argued that 
the degeneration of American education was the result of 
equality gone awry; this misguided sense of equality had 
allowed talented American students to go without proper 
education (Rickover, 1959) , particularly in comparison to 
the countries of Europe (Rickover, 1962, 1963) . Although 
future developments turned the attention of some educators 
in other directions, concern about students who are 
thought to have the most to offer society has formed a 
lasting undercurrent in educational circles, particularly 
in mathematics education. In regard to the technological 
crisis, it has been to the identification and retention of 
precisely these students, in general as well as 
specifically female and minority students, that current
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reform efforts are being addressed (NCTM, 1986, 1989,
1990). In relation to gender, such differentiations have 
their roots in theories of masculine superiority (Cooper, 
1985b).
Changes in Mathematics Pedagogy
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the school 
population in the United States was growing both as the 
general population increased and as more students stayed 
in school through graduation (Philadelphia Suburban School 
Study Council, 1964). In addition to growing larger, the 
demographics of schools were also changing as the gains 
made by supporters of integration, beginning with Brown v 
Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas in 1954, were 
implemented (Howes, 1970b).
The launch of Sputnik, and the availability of funds 
that it triggered, had contributed to concern about both 
kinds of exceptional students, those identified as 
talented as well as those considered "underprivileged" 
(Griffiths and Howson, 1974, p. 138). Initially, most 
effort had been devoted to the mathematics education of 
talented students; the result of this emphasis was the 
rise of ability grouping. Students grouped by ability, it 
was thought, would receive an education specifically 
tailored to their needs and the needs of others like them. 
As the demographics of the school population, as well as
the tenor of public discourse surrounding the education of 
minority children, changed, more attention was given in 
the literature to identifying and separating 
"disadvantaged" students from other students, determining 
the needs of such students, and meeting those needs in the 
mathematics classroom (Mintz, 1968; Pflaum, 1968; Sobel, 
1967; Stovall, 1968; Troisi, 1968). However, a few argued 
that good mathematics education for all students would 
also meet the needs of "non-achievers" and "culturally 
disadvantaged" students (Davis, 1967, p. 12). It was 
argued that special attention for these mostly minority 
and/or urban students was not necessary provided that the 
goal of good mathematics education for all was realized.
In this attempt to provide a strong education for all 
students, considerable effort was devoted to exploring the 
classroom practices and theoretical assumptions 
surrounding grouping students by ability. A practice that 
had been gaining momentum since the 1930s (DeHaan & Doll, 
1964), ability grouping was the most commonly-used method 
of grouping students to maximize achievement (Weaver,
1961) and, in the 1960s, it increasingly came under attack 
by educational theorists and researchers. Groups of 
students arranged homogeneously by ability as defined by 
one standard, it was argued (Goodlad and Anderson, 1959; 
Weaver, 1961) , were certainly heterogeneously grouped by 
any other standard. Goodlad and Anderson (1959) add:
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The greatest variation occurs, usually, for 
children at the top and bottom of the 
achievement continuum. And yet, paradoxically, 
when grouping by ability levels is proposed in 
educational circles, it is invariably the gifted 
or the slow who are to be segregated into 
"homogeneous" groups (p. 15).
Concerns about the problems of creating homogeneous groups
of students led away from strict reliance on academic
ability to plans for grouping students in other ways.
Additional motivation for moving away from creating
homogeneous classes was provided by the worry that ability
grouping contributed to a "wastage of talent" among
students of "lower ability" (Kelly, 1978, p. 10) by
denying them contact with their more able peers. Concern
with waste hastened the move to find ways of
differentiating methods, assignments, and rates of
progress (Goodlad and Anderson, 1959; Melby, et a l ., 1964;
Howes, 1970b; Duker, 1972) in order to provide better
educational outcomes for all students.
As educators probed the problems of ability grouping,
the importance of individual differences crystallized.
Many in the education community embraced individualized
instruction as the pedagogic key to reaching masses of
students who were failing or rejecting mathematics
courses. The period from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s
showed an increase in the number of educators proclaiming
the virtues of an individualized mathematics program which
would not only allow for differences in learning rates,
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but allow students to pursue "personal investigations 
. . . which develop from problems children face as they 
explore the environment" (Howes, 1970a, p. v ) .
Schools were criticized for disregarding differences 
among learners and perpetuating practices that "accentuate 
rather that alleviate individual differences" (Duker,
1972, p. 20). In the literature on individualized 
instruction, numerous differences in student ability and 
preparedness are highlighted: parental involvement, prior
school experiences, participation in Head Start programs, 
military service of parent(s), sibling rank, maturity of 
student, personal health, and social status3 (West & Doll, 
1964; Keuscher, 1970; Duker, 1972). Left unaddressed, 
such differences grow larger rather than smaller as time 
spent in school increases (Thomas & Thomas, 1965) . In 
order to individualize instruction, "ways to permit the 
student to progress at his rate according to his style of 
learning and ways to motivate him to think creatively in 
formulating his mathematical concepts and knowledge of 
mathematics" had to be developed (Gibb, 1972, p. 394; 
italics added).
Historically, the curriculum differentiated by 
ability has also been differentiated by gender, race, and
3It is interesting to note that each of these lists 
fails to include categories of gender or race. However, 
the current discourse on gender has taken up the fight to 
eliminate the waste of talent in mathematics.
social class (Cooper, 1985b; Kliebard, 1987). The 
challenge sounded by the opponents of ability grouping
resonated first with the struggles of black Americans, and
later with those of women. By rejecting ability grouping, 
educators were able to embrace a theory of education that 
proposed to deliver the best possible education for each 
individual student. In this view, the rejection of 
differentiation by ability results in a less 
discriminatory presentation of mathematics curricula.
A strong undercurrent in the tension over grouping 
patterns is waste, a legacy of social efficiency theory in 
education (Kliebard, 1987). On the one hand, teaching all
students in the same way eliminates the waste of preparing
multiple lessons and goals; educators need only expend 
their energies to find and deliver the best possible 
instruction. In such a system, all students are treated 
identically, and students are grouped by ability to 
facilitate identical treatment. On the other hand, 
teaching students in the manner which is best for each of 
them can be seen as less wasteful, for each student gets 
the maximum benefit from school, and can contribute 
her/his best to society. In this system, students are 
given the education which best suits them and, since 
individual needs and abilities vary, instruction (and 
perhaps curriculum) is varied to meet the needs and 
develop the abilities of every student. Since each
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student is necessarily different, there is no need to 
attempt to group students by ability.
Although committed to individualization at the 
theoretical level, educators found that developing and 
implementing a curriculum that is completely 
individualized is a difficult goal to reach at the level 
of classroom practice. A variety of ways to individualize 
instruction were proposed: nongraded schools,
departmentalization, teacher-student contracting, 
Individually Prescribed Instruction [IPI], and computer- 
assisted instruction [CAI] (Goodlad, 1959; Howes, 1970; 
NCTM, 1970; Gibb, 1972). These last two, IPI and CAI, 
were promoted as both highly individualized and efficient: 
students progress at different rates, receiving 
appropriate instruction, assignments, feedback, diagnosis, 
and remediation automatically.
Technology and Mathematics Education
Even as educators were moving from ability grouping 
towards a recognition that "all teaching . . .  is mixed 
ability teaching" (Ridley, 1982, p. 37), meeting the 
demands of living in a technological world remained 
central. The educational system "must be productive of 
adaptable citizens" (Kelly, 1978, p. 23) who can live with 
today's technology as well as accept that such technology 
is already moving toward obsolescence.
One outstanding feature of the discourse on 
individualized instruction is the belief in the potential 
of the electronic digital computer as the vehicle for 
realizing truly individualized instruction (Darnowski, 
1970; Suppes, 1970). In this case, the power of the 
computer lay in its ability to record and respond to 
student errors rapidly, and to supply pre-programmed 
instructional tasks to rectify those errors, all without 
the intervention of the teacher. Unfortunately, the 
difficulties and expenses involved in bringing computers 
into every classroom, or even into every mathematics and 
science classroom, have not been overcome at the rate 
assumed by mathematics and science educators in the 1970s; 
wide-spread computer-assisted instruction is still only on 
its way to becoming a reality (Apple, 1988).
There are actually two representations of computer 
technology (which can be extended to a broader sense of 
technology), in the educational literature: (1)
technology as a component of the curriculum and (2) 
technology as a device for instruction. This first sense 
does not refer to courses in "computer literacy," where 
students are taught programming. The NCTM position 
statement on the use of computers states that "computer 
programming activities in mathematics classes should be 
used to support mathematics instruction; they should not 
be the focus of instruction" (NCTM, 1987, p. 15). But
technology becomes an implicit part of the curriculum when 
time and emphasis are allocated to certain topics or 
instructional modes "consistent with their importance in 
an age of increased access to technology" (NCTM, 1987, p. 
15) and when the content of the curriculum is determined 
to a significant degree by technological changes and 
applications (NCTM, 1989).
It is to the second sense, technology as a device for 
instruction, that the majority of efforts have been 
addressed. These efforts are rooted in the belief that 
new skills are "necessary for adaptation to constant 
technological and occupational change" (Noble, 1988, 242) 
and that schooling should provide these skills. Indeed, 
there is continued belief among educators, an extension of 
the larger cultural faith discussed earlier, that "'high 
tech' . . . will save our students and teachers" (Apple,
1988, p. 291) as computers allow education to accomplish 
its goals more effectively and efficiently (Noble, 1988; 
NCTM, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991a), including the goals of 
gender and racial equity. Although mathematics educators 
were initially reluctant to allow computer and calculator 
technology into the classroom for fear that students would 
fail to learn to perform paper-and-pencil calculations, 
this worry has been officially abandoned (NCTM, 1987,
1989, 1990, 1991a; National Research Council [NRC], 1989).
The sense of crisis in mathematics education that
followed the launch of Sputnik re-appeared more recently
in 1983 with publication of the report of the National
Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE), A Nation At
Risk. Once again, our "preeminence in commerce, industry,
science, and technological innovation" (NCEE, 1983, p. 5)
was threatened by an educational system too inadequate to
properly prepare students for the world in which they
lived. Though now couched in fewer militaristic and more
economic terms since the fall of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, this remains much the same crisis
that emerged following Sputnik and is driven by deep-
seated feelings of patriotism:
Our children could be stragglers in a world of 
technology. We must not let this happen;
America must not become an industrial dinosaur.
We must not provide our children a 1960s 
education for a twenty-first century world. 
(Fausto-Sterling, 1985, p. 54)
One key to providing this "twenty-first century" 
education was the incorporation of technology. As early 
as 1975, participants in the National Institute of 
Education Conference on Basic Mathematical Skills and 
Learning were considering the place of technology in 
mathematics education. Some clutched desperately at the 
old ways:
It is . . . important to have students
understand how and why calculations work in 
order to use calculating devices correctly.
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Knowing how to calculate often tells you when to 
calculate by that particular process.141
Still, calculating should be placed in 
proper perspective. The present rate of sale 
for hand-held calculators . . . suggests that
computation should be taught in this form:
"What if we were shipwrecked on a desert island 
and we wanted to . . ." (Rising, 1975, p. 152)
But the majority of positions at this conference were
articulating the currently-accepted position regarding the
use of calculating technology in the mathematics classroom
(Armstrong, et al., 1975; Branca, et al., 1975; Buchanan,
et al. , 1975; Romberg, 1975) . Within a few years, more
and more people were listing and praising the uses and
benefits of calculators and computers in the mathematics
classroom (Collis, 1983; Coleman & Selby, 1983; Fitting,
1983; Kurtz, 1983; NCTM, 1978). Although not as fully
developed as current recommendations and suggestions
(NCTM, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991a; NRC, 1989) in recent
years, the publications of this period clearly set the
stage for future positions on the place of calculators and
computers in the classroom (NCTM, 1980) .
Since the publication of Curriculum and Evaluation
Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM, 1989) , the
prominence of technology in mathematics education has
continued to expand (Branca, Breedlove, & King, 1992;
4Given the state of students' abilities at solving 
word problems as compared to performing computations, the 
validity of this statement is dubious at best.
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Burrill, 1992; Hembree & Dessart, 1992; Wheatley &
Shumway, 19 92).
Technology not only has made calculation and 
graphing easier, it has changed the very nature 
of the problems important to mathematics and the 
methods mathematicians use to investigate them. 
Because technology is changing mathematics and 
its uses, we believe that appropriate 
calculators151 should be available to all 
students at all times; a computer should be 
available in every classroom for demonstration 
purposes; every student should have access to a 
computer for individual and group work; students 
should learn to use the computer as a tool for 
processing information and performing 
calculations to investigate and solve problems.
(NCTM, 1989, p. 8)
Because "what students learn is fundamentally connected
with how students learn" (NCTM, 1991d), the introduction
of calculators and computers into the classroom has clear
political and economic purposes.
The economic status quo in which factory workers 
work the same jobs to produce the same goods in 
the same manner for decades is a throwback to 
our industrial past. . . . Traditional notions
of basic mathematical competence have been 
outstripped by ever-higher expectations of the 
skills and knowledge of workers; new methods of 
production demand a technologically competent 
workforce. (NCTM, 1989, p. 3)
Not only is technology to become a critical tool in
learning mathematics, acceptance of it has become a
central purpose of teaching mathematics.
5This notion of appropriate calculators has been 
taken so seriously that Texas Instruments has developed 
several different calculators for students at various 
levels that are only available through educational 
suppliers. Thus, the relationship between mathematics 
education and the business of technology grows 
increasingly complex.
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This brief history of educational reform highlights 
the centrality and magnitude of the force exerted by 
technological concerns. Although educators have varied 
widely in their approaches to education, the aim of that 
education is to prepare students for the ever-changing 
world in which they will live. Technology is more than a 
curriculum component or teaching tool; it has become the 
force that motivates reform, and the criterion by which 
success is measured.
Women and Technology
The attention of feminist scholars has also turned to 
considerations of technology and its relationship to 
gender. In examinations of the history of technology, 
feminists found that inventions and devices used or 
developed primarily by women were entirely absent. For 
example, the baby bottle, a significant and wide-spread 
technological device, has been one of the more 
controversial exports of Western technology to developing 
nations. This device, which alters the interactions of 
mothers and children, had been entirely omitted from all 
"standard histories of technology" (Cowen, 1979/1991).
The realization that histories of technology did not 
include references to female inventors or to innovations 
related to women's social roles led to even greater 
interest in the field of technology. Feminist scholars
have since written about the contributions of women to 
technology, from ancient times (Alic, 1981; Stanley, 1981, 
1983; Vare & Ptacek, 1988) to more recent events, 
recounting the innovations of American Shaker women in 
domestic and commercial technology (Irvin, 1981) and the 
biographies of female engineers (Trescott, 1983). Others 
have explored the impact of technology on household chores 
(Bose, Bereano, & Malloy, 1984/1991; Hoy, 1985/1991; 
Rothschild, 1983), on women's waged work (Arnold, Birke, & 
Faulkner, 1981; Feldberg & Glenn, 1983; Zimmerman, 1981), 
women's communication (Kramarae, 1988), and women's health 
and reproduction technology (Glendinning, 1990; Ratcliff, 
et a l ., 1989; Rothman, 1989).
Although women have traditionally been regarded as 
closer to nature than to technology, the contributions of 
females to technological innovation have been widespread 
and consistent throughout Western history. Hypatia, known 
primarily for her mathematical teaching in ancient Greece, 
also developed numerous scientific instruments, including 
an astrolabe, a device for distilling water and a 
hydrometer for determining the specific gravity of liquids 
(Alic, 1981). In the Middle Ages, before the science of 
medicine moved from the female realm into the male, female 
healers knew that moldy bread prevented infection, used
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belladonna to prevent miscarriages, and treated heart 
ailments with digitalis (Stanley, 1983).6
Of particular note is Mothers of Invention: From the
Bra to the Bomb: Forgotten Women & Their Unforgettable
Ideas (Vare & Ptacek, 1988). Authors Ethlie Ann Vare and 
Greg Ptacek seek to fill the void in history by detailing 
the contributions of female inventors, including solar 
heating, the drip coffeepot, refrigeration, the square- 
bottomed paper bag, invisible glass, usable penicillin, 
tract housing, the "Geiger" counter, Liquid Paper, and 
sediment-free champagne. In some instances, the authors 
also correct textbook versions of history, for example 
crediting Catherine Littefield Greene of Georgia with the 
creation, perfection, and marketing of the cotton gin; Eli 
Whitney, her houseguest from Massachusetts, was its 
builder.
Any history of technology that fails to recognize the 
ongoing contributions of women defines technology a priori 
as those things that men do. This male bias perpetuates 
the image of technology as masculine, ignores those 
"feminine" technologies that affect our lives, and 
continues to cast women as "technologically ignorant and
6When medicine became the province of men, these 
treatments were considered "superstition"; the male 
physicians prescribed bleedings and incantations instead. 
Modern medical practice has "discovered" that penicillin 
can be produced from moldy bread, and derivatives of 
belladonna are still used as antispasmodics.
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incapable" (Wajcman, 1991, p. 137). These "feminine"
technologies have been fundamental in the development of
human civilization and are generally located in the areas
of horticulture, childcare, and food preparation (Stanley,
1981; Vare & Ptacek, 1988). Although the technological
developments of women have tended to fall in the spheres
of life for which women are responsible, women have made
significant contributions to more "masculine" spheres like
atomic physics, computer programming, and engineering
(Irvin, 1981; Trescott, 1983; Vare and Ptacek, 1988).
In seeking to understand the relationship between
gender and technology in contemporary culture, it is
crucial that the relationship between technology and
nature, and between nature and gender, be explicitly
revealed. As Ynestra King (1983) observes,
In the process of building Western industrial 
civilization, nature became something to be 
dominated, overcome, made to serve the needs of 
men. She was stripped of her magical powers and 
properties as these beliefs were relegated to 
the trashbin of superstition. Nature was 
reduced to "natural resources" to be exploited 
by human beings to fulfill human needs and 
purposes which were defined in opposition to 
nature. . . . With the disenchantment of nature
came the conditions for unchecked scientific 
exploration and technological exploitation.
(pp. 120-121)
Nature has changed from a living entity to be revered and 
respected to a resource to be managed and controlled; 
throughout recent history, the relationship between humans 
and the natural world has been one of exploitation and
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domination -- exploitation of female nature, domination by
man. This relation of exploitation and domination has
resulted in a society that is fundamentally anti-nature as
well as anti-female.
The tradition of viewing nature as female is longer
than that of written history; the subjugation of female
nature to male forces is deeply embedded in patriarchal
systems of modern thought and action. As Cynthia Cockburn
(1985) states:
Our industrial technology . . . has the imprint
and the limitations that come of being both the 
social property and one of the formative 
processes of men. Industrial, commercial, 
military technologies, are masculine in a very 
historical and material sense. . . . Industry
and contemporary technology both express and 
embody values that on the one hand developed out 
of patriarchy, and on the other have developed 
to make patriarchy what it is in modern society.
The relations surrounding technology continually 
renew and extend male hegemony over the rest of 
us. (pp. 56-58)
It is crucial at this point to clarify the purpose of 
this critique of technology. I am not suggesting that 
machinery, techniques, and tools be thrown away to allow a 
return to some mystical, mythical, non-technological, non­
sexist past, but instead that we seek to understand the 
"technological ideology" that defines all action in terms 
of making, of production. Thus,
the critique of technology . . . is an objection
to the nation of the world as a machine, the 
body as a machine, everything subject to 
hierarchical control, the world, ourselves, or 
bodies and our souls, ourselves and our
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children, divided, systematized, reduced.
(Rothman, 1989, p. 54)
Reducing everything to something which is made, and every
act to the act of making, can allow anything to become a
commodity. As Barbara Katz Rothman (1989) observes:
U. S. Court of Appeals judge, Richard Posner,
. . . advocates eliminating inefficient adoption
agencies and legalizing the sale of babies.
What is there in our way of viewing the world, 
in our values, ideas, beliefs, and culture, that 
enables us to think of a baby as a commodity?
Even if we reject it, it was a "thinkable" 
thought and we know what he means. (p. 51)
We do indeed know what he means as "unthinkable" as it
sounds. That it is possible to put into words makes the
point.
In her examination of the impact of technology on 
motherhood, Rothman links the technological ideology with 
liberal philosophy, the foundation of American political 
systems. Therefore, "liberal philosophy, the intellectual 
underpinning of the American revolution and of American 
government, is the articulation of the technological 
ideology in the social order" (p. 58). From these liberal 
foundations spring a number of unequal dichotomies: 
mind/body, mental labor/manual labor, science/nature, and 
male/female.
Liberalism. Feminism and Technology
Alison Jaggar (1983) identifies two tenets of liberal 
theory that are significant here: that rationality is a
mental capacity; and that rationality is a characteristic 
of individual human beings, not of social groups. The 
first of these assumptions, that rationality is mental 
rather than physical, disconnects the mind from the body, 
emphasizing and privileging mental functions over physical 
ones. It is not coincidental that, historically, men have 
been connected more closely with the mental, and women 
with the physical. The second assumption, that 
rationality is a feature of individuals rather than of 
social groups, functions to disconnect human actors from 
the social arena in which they act, similar to the 
function of the mind/body dualism of the first assumption. 
This abstract individualism discourages the recognition 
that rationality is constituted or defined by group norms 
that are culturally specific; this failure allows liberals 
to present their version of abstract individualism as a 
universal characteristic of humanity (Bowers, 1993, p.
89). Furthermore, failing to acknowledge the cultural 
grounding of group norms denies the possibility of making 
those norms explicit and subject to group consideration, 
critique, and revision. The final assumption identified 
by Jaggar (1983) , that the capacity for rationality is 
possessed by all human beings in approximately equal 
measures, universalizes one view of human nature, 
rendering alternative and incompatible perspectives silent 
and invisible.
This grounding in liberalism has several important 
implications for education. First, the perception of 
human beings as self-constituting individuals who make 
their own reality denies the cultural roots of thinking 
and knowing. Far from making something from nothing, the 
thoughts of an "individual" are shaped by the "thought 
patterns of the cultural group" (Bowers, 1993, p.89). 
Furthermore, by failing to recognize the relationship 
between cultures and individuals, liberal theorists 
universalize a mechanistic view of the world that is not 
shared by all other cultures. For instance, the modern 
view that progress is constant and change is inevitable is 
not consistent with Native American cultures that place 
higher value on the continual "re-enactment of traditional 
patterns . . .  of existence" (p. 88); likewise, the notion 
of the autonomous individual does not mesh with a 
worldview that "conceives of the self not as strictly 
delimited or defined, but as [at most] a concentration.
. . . Most of what is other for us is [for Native
Americans] . . . identified with the self" (p. 92; italics
added). The language of such groups does not permit the 
expression of autonomy, the separation from the social, 
cultural, and physical environment that is characteristic 
of liberalism.
The autonomous individual of liberal theory comes to 
know through interaction with data; the electronic
computer is one means through which access to data can be 
increased, thereby increasing the potential for developing 
individual rationality. All knowledge that is worthwhile 
can be stored and transmitted in this form. Such a view 
fails to consider forms of knowledge and ways of knowing 
that are not reducible to data or information, such as 
analogical knowing; not only are these alternatives not 
considered as valid, they are often not realized at all.
Because rationality is a singularly human capacity, 
the highest value is placed "on those activities which 
tare] perceived as requiring the most use of reason" 
(Jaggar, 1983, p. 175); intellectual pursuits are favored 
over physical endeavors, science and mathematics over 
poetry and sculpture. Underlying the view of educational 
technology as revolutionary and emancipatory is, again, a 
core of liberal assumptions that go largely unnoticed. As 
C. A. Bowers (1993) points out in "Ideology, Educational 
Computing and the Moral Poverty of the Information Age," 
these core assumptions include the essential elements of 
liberalism: individual autonomy, rational empowerment
through increased access to information, the linear and 
progressive nature of change, and anthropocentrism. The 
discourse of educational technology is closely bound to 
the ideology of liberalism, emphasizing the individual's 
capacity to reason and deemphasizing the relationship 
between the individual and the culture.
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At the heart of liberal theory is the notion of
equity. For liberal feminists, the capacity for
rationality is not related to gender; with equal access to
data, women's rational abilities can equal those of men.
For contemporary liberal feminists, equity is interpreted
to mean equal opportunity. To quote Jaggar (1983):
When liberal feminists talk about opportunities 
. . . they mean opportunities for securing the
prestige, power and (usually) wealth that are 
the rewards of success in industry, commerce, 
scholarship, the arts, entertainment, politics, 
or sport. . . .  A predominance of men in any 
area is taken as evidence that opportunities in 
fact have not been equalized. Thus, while 
liberal feminist theory professes [not to know] 
the results of equalizing opportunities between 
women and men, liberal feminist practice assumes 
that those results can be predicted. (pp. 194- 
195)
Devoted to individual equality, liberal feminists struggle 
to equate the genders, concentrating their efforts on 
securing equal access and rewards through legal and 
educational means.
Whether opportunities are equal is determined by the 
degree to which outcomes are equal. In other words, if 
women and men have the same opportunities, the choices of 
women will parallel those of men. Outcomes that are not 
equal are seen as compelling evidence that opportunities 
are not equal. In mathematics, this means that if women 
do not achieve and participate at the same level as men 
then the goal of equal opportunity has not been reached.
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It becomes necessary, then, to control and direct
outcomes to ensure that the goal of truly equal
opportunity has been reached. In mathematics education,
this means that women must profess attitudes and take
actions that are similar to those of men. The aim of
liberal feminists then is to discover ways to control and
direct the choices of women in relation to mathematics, an
aim at odds with the emphasis placed on individual freedom
in liberal theory:
In its pursuit of equal opportunities, liberal 
feminism . . . challenges the liberal value of
individual liberty. . . .  In their attempts to 
eliminate restrictions on women's equality of 
opportunity, contemporary liberal feminists 
place heavy reliance on the action of the state.
. . . However, if liberal feminists were to 
follow their own logic through to the end, the 
notion of equal opportunity could be used to 
justify state control of every aspect of life.
. . . Equality of opportunity is incompatible 
with individual liberty, a value which is at 
least as basic as equality within the liberal 
tradition. (p. 195)
Education and Technology
The educational impact of the launch of Sputnik, 
although distant, is not yet too faint to be noticed. 
Although altered by the end of the Cold War, the 
technological crisis that it spawned is still in the 
forefront of the nation's consciousness. Coupled with the 
gains of the most recent surge in feminist activity, fears 
of technological obsolescence and hope in technological 
salvation have lead to increased interest in the
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mathematical participation of females. Grounded in
liberalism, this discourse seeks to predict and ultimately
to control the choices of women for technological ends.
In the years since Sputnik and Women's Lib, these two
concerns have become deeply entwined in the goals of
mathematics education. In the introduction to Curriculum
and Evaluation Standards for School Mathematics (NCTM,
1989) both mathematics education for a technological world
and equal opportunities for women and minority students
are highlighted:
Women and most minorities . . . are seriously
underrepresented in careers using science and 
technology. . . .  We cannot afford to have the 
majority of our population mathematically 
illiterate. Equity has become an economic 
necessity. (p. 4)
Concerns about gender equity in mathematics education stem
from this sense of crisis in science and technology. This
anxiety about our technological future has found a toehold
in differences based on gender: in order to increase the
number of mathematicians, scientists, and technologists,
we need only increase the proportions of female and
minority students in mathematics courses; the deficiencies
of women have become the salvation of the country.
Educational technology has been embraced both as the means
for achieving gender equity and as the justification for
pursuing equity in mathematics education.
A series of studies by Mary Poplin (1991) looked at
"the concerns over women's underachievement (as compared
to men's) in mathematical and computer pursuits" (p. 1) 
After identifying women with high mathematics aptitude, 
Poplin interviewed those who had not selected mathemati 
or technological careers: All were aware of the
advantages, particularly financial, of mathematics- or 
computer-related careers. Poplin concluded from these 
interviews that they " [made] self-conscious and well- 
informed choices about not participating in math . . .
[and were] not simply manipulated by society" (p. 23) . 
She says:
I have been convinced . . . that their
disinterest is an actively constructed one [and]
I am more cautious in my pronouncements that we 
simply must get more women into math. . . .  I, 
like many feminists, am wondering if it would 
not be more profitable to strive to upgrade the 
status of the fields women enjoy than to try to 
change our ourselves and our interests to match 
more nearly those of men. (pp. 24-25)
Her misgivings about encouraging women to pursue the
interests of men are echoed by Cynthia Cockburn (1985) :
Women are not merely failing to enter 
technology. On the one hand we are being 
repelled, and on the other we are refusing. (p.
56)
By insisting that women join the technological push, we 
demand that these women forget that technological 
innovation surged in opposition to the ultimate icon of 
femininity, nature. Acknowledging the legitimacy of 
alternative choices is grounded in the rejection of 
liberal notions of equality measured by outcomes.
We have accepted the crisis of Sputnik and framed our 
response to it: our problems, perhaps now more economic
and corporate than militaristic, can be resolved through 
technological progress. The solution to the threat of 
technological obsolescence is to increase the number of 
technologists. As the population of schools (and society) 
has diversified, concerns for the mathematics education of 
female and other minority students have grown, not from 
egalitarianism, but from technological and economic 
necessity. As institutions of patriarchy, the needs of 
business and industry require that the technological 
participation of women be indistinguishable from that of 
men. Any alternative considerations or contributions that 
women might bring are potentially threatening to the 
perpetuation of technological innovation. As Bowers 
(1993) notes, technology is being used "to serve the 
interests of specific groups -- centralizing economic and 
political power by making the panopticon society a closer 
reality and by turning many work settings into 'electronic 
sweatshops'" (p. 85); one is forced to wonder what the 
nature of women's technological participation will entail.
It is into this technological crisis that research in 
gender and mathematics education has been subsumed. In 
serving the purposes of technological progress we have 
allowed our research questions to be determined for us.
We have steered away from looking to our definition of
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mathematics itself, and the liberal ideology which 
supports it. We have been directed toward questions about 
the gender differences in students, and away from 
questions regarding the gendered nature of mathematics.
CHAPTER 4
JUST US GIRLS:
EXPLORING THE FEMININE SIDE OF MATHEMATICS
Mention mathematics to a woman and she freezes 
into a condescending attitude of tolerance--she 
knows it exists, she uses it when she must, but 
it certainly has very little to do with her own 
delightfully imaginative and delicate world of 
interests. (Weber, 1957; quoted in Sommer,
1958)
On the eighth day, God created mathematics. He 
took stainless steel, and he rolled it out thin, 
and he made it into a fence, forty cubits high, 
and infinite cubits long. And on this fence, in 
fair capitals, he did print rules, theorems, 
axioms, and pointed reminders. "Invert and 
multiply." "The square on the hypotenuse is 
three decibels louder than one hand clapping." 
"Always do what's in the parentheses first."
And when he was finished, he said, "On one side 
of the fence will reside those who are good at 
math. And on the other will remain those who 
are bad at math, and woe unto them, for they 
shall weep and gnash their teeth." (Buerk,
1985, p. 59)
It is shocking to find how many people do not 
believe they can learn, and how many more 
believe learning to be difficult. (Herbert, 
1965, p. 64)
The majority of research in gender and mathematics, 
examined in chapter 2, begins with the "fact" that women 
do not participate in mathematics to the degree that men 
do, and with the assumption that women do not achieve at 
the same level in mathematics as men do. For the most 
part, research that begins in this place has confirmed the
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inferior status, however it is defined, of women's 
participation and attainment in mathematics. But if we 
alter our assumptions and our initial questions, we will 
reach conclusions that will be very different.
First generation research seeks to explain and 
ultimately to alter women's decisions to avoid mathematics 
because the researchers assume that women in fact avoid 
mathematics. This assumption is based in a male-centered 
definition of mathematics that recognizes the mathematical 
aspect of activity only if the majority of people engaging 
in that activity are men. In other words, occupations 
like engineering and medicine are seen as mathematical 
because, in addition to obvious mathematical content, the 
majority of engineers and physicians are men; if the 
majority of physicians were female, it is reasonable to 
suspect that the position would not be as highly regarded, 
nor seen as particularly mathematics-related. To 
understand this point, one need look no farther than the 
related field of nursing.
What these researchers have failed to see is the need 
for an explicit definition of what constitutes 
mathematical activity. All of the studies that have been 
cited so far have assumed that a common definition of 
mathematics exist and is shared by the researchers, the 
subjects of research, and the readers. It is particularly 
troubling that the central concept being investigated is
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not worthy of explicit definition. Possible definitions 
of mathematics, and the implications for women, will be 
explored in this chapter. Of specific interest is how the 
activities of women and men get defined as mathematical or 
not.
Most of the research in mathematics and gender has 
focused on the differences between females and males, but 
some attention has been given to how women learn and do 
mathematics. This is second generation research, which 
"embraces [women's] special qualities and rejects 
uncritical assimilation into the male world" (Noddings, 
1990b, p. 393). Second generation work has its own 
benefits and problems, which will also be explored in this 
chapter. Before an examination of this research is 
conducted, it is imperative that the meaning(s) of 
mathematics be treated explicitly.
Meaning(s) of Mathematics
Philosophers of mathematics Philip Davis and Reuben 
Hersh (1981) begin The Mathematical Experience by defining 
mathematics as "the science of quantity and space," 
including the symbol systems, which they call a "naive 
definition, adequate for the dictionary and for an initial 
understanding" (p. 6). Near the end of the volume, having 
examined the foundations and history of mathematics, they 
redefine mathematics as "the study of mental objects with
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reproducible qualities" (p. 399). An alternative way to
phrase this definition is that mathematics is the science
of patterns involving quantity and/or space. All of these
definitions are similar in that they emphasize the
reproducibility of mathematical results, as well as its
geometrical and numerical aspects.
For those interested in gender and mathematics,
another defining feature of mathematics is its "male-
centeredness.1,1 Historically, most mathematicians have
been men; while there have certainly been notable
exceptions, it is more likely that someone could name ten
famous male mathematicians than one female mathematician.
As Spender (1993) notes:
Even such ostensibly neutral subjects as math 
and science have assumed the centrality of the 
male; the examples relate to males, the 
illustrations take males as the standard, and 
while women have a splendid history of 
achievement as mathematicians, it would be 
possible for students to graduate from advanced 
mathematics classes without knowing that women 
ever participated, let alone excelled, in this 
area. (p. 44)
The common perception of mathematics as a male domain
stems from the historic male dominance of the field, and
educators interested in gender-equitable mathematics
1It is also appropriate to understand mathematics in 
this sense as a European-centered activity. Although 
numerous contributions to mathematical knowledge have been 
made outside Europe, in the last several centuries those in 
the West have dominated mathematical activity.
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education have focused considerable effort on eliminating 
this perception.
An alternative view of mathematics centers on the 
doing of mathematics, rather than on mathematical content 
or on the gender of those who engage in mathematical 
activity; rather than a masculine activity, mathematics in 
this view is a human endeavor. As a look to history 
confirms, those who do mathematics are found in all 
cultures and of both genders. Understanding mathematics 
in terms of doing mathematics represents a significant 
shift in the underlying philosophy of mathematics, and 
opens up many possibilities for the mathematics education 
of women.
If we base our definition of what mathematics is on 
how one engages in mathematical activity, then who engages 
in that activity becomes central. Further, by looking at 
different "doers" and groups of doers, we can make the 
case for multiple, perhaps contradictory, definitions of 
mathematics and mathematical knowledge. Exploring these 
possibilities for women is the focus of this chapter.
Social Constructivism and the Meaning of Mathematics
For centuries, mathematics has been dominated by the 
philosophy of absolutism which views mathematical 
knowledge as universal and infallible. But mathematicians 
and philosophers of mathematics are no longer able to
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sustain the myth of absolutism2 primarily due to
difficulties encountered in set theory (Davis & Hersh,
1981). Out of these difficulties have risen various forms
of fallibilism, which hold that "mathematical truth is
fallible and corrigible, and can never be regarded as
beyond revision and correction" (P. Ernest, 1991, p. 18) .
In the monograph Constructivist Views on the Teaching
and Learning of Mathematics, Nel Noddings (1990a) examines
the implications of constructivist philosophy on
mathematics education. Constructivists must abandon the
search for absolute truth and "recognize . . . the
temporality of knowledge" (p. 12). But if all knowledge
is construction, how can we determine which knowledge is
valid and which is not?
One of the first questions we ask when we are 
faced with an alleged knowledge claim is, "Who 
said that?" If [it] is a mathematical 
statement, we are more likely to accept it if 
George Polya or John von Neumann is its source 
than if, say, Ronald Reagan or a local high 
school student came up with it. The 
mathematicians have an authority that the other 
two do not have.
But our judgement is not based on raw 
authority. The mathematicians' authority is not 
like that of the pope (or, at least, it 
shouldn't be). We do not accept their word 
simply because their office confers unassailable 
authority. Rather we accept [the mathematical 
statement], tentatively, because we know that 
mathematicians belong to a community that 
subjects all knowledge claims to careful 
scrutiny, and the criteria for such scrutiny are
2For a complete exposition of the problems associated 
with absolutist philosophies, see P. Ernest, 1991, The 
Philosophy of Mathematics Education, London: Falmer.
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laid out for all the community to see. (pp. 11-
12)
However, the result of construction may be errors that are 
not detected in the consideration process; indeed, there 
is always some skepticism over the completeness and 
correctness of a proof (Davis & Hersh, 1981). It is this 
doubt that fuels efforts to investigate questions in the 
field of interest, questions which lead to further 
constructions resulting in still more possible knowledge 
presented to the community.
In The Philosophy of Mathematics Education, Paul 
Ernest (1991) proposes a variation on this philosophy of 
mathematics, social constructivism. Rather than focussing 
only on the justification of mathematical knowledge, as 
absolutist philosophies do, social constructivism 
addresses the genesis of mathematical knowledge as well as 
its justification. By this admission, Ernest is able to 
link objective and subjective knowledge "in a cycle in 
which each contributes to the renewal of the other" (p.
43) .
The distinction that Ernest draws between objective 
knowledge and subjective knowledge is key. Subjective 
knowledge is the knowledge of an individual; in regards to 
mathematics, subjective thought is the mathematical 
thought of an individual mathematician. Objective 
knowledge, rather than "true" or "real" in the absolutist 
sense, is knowledge which is socially accepted. The
mathematical knowledge of an individual mathematician, 
subjective knowledge, can become objective knowledge 
through the process of publication, criticism, revision, 
and acceptance by the mathematics community. Through the 
process of education, objective mathematical knowledge -- 
theorems, proofs, procedures, and linguistic conventions 
-- may be internalized and therefore become the subjective 
knowledge of the learner. But defining objective 
knowledge as that which is socially accepted means that 
one forsakes any claims to unshakable truth, which makes 
mathematical knowledge fallible. Any knowledge currently 
accepted is subject to challenge, modification, or 
rejection at any time by the community, in this case, by 
mathematicians. (See Figure 1.)
At this point, a nonmathematical example may assist 
in understanding. Take the following statement: Columbus
discovered America in 14 92. For many people, this is a 
simple statement of fact. Christopher Columbus did locate 
and map land unknown in Europe at the time, it was 
subsequently called America, and it did happen in 1492. 
This is objective knowledge, agreed to by most in the 
public community. As a student in public school, this 
objective knowledge was given to me so that it would 
become part of my subjective knowledge. I was even taught 
a rhyme to help me remember it.
110
Figure 1 . Venn diagram illustrating the relationship 
between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge 
described by P. Ernest (1991).
Ill
But recently, with the 500th anniversary of this
"discovery," its general acceptance has been subjected to
challenge from many sides. Some claim that other
explorers came to the new world before Columbus, by
perhaps as much as 2 00 0 years. Others claim that no one
could be credited with "discovering" this land other than
the ancestors of the people living here before any
explorers arrived. Still others, shocked and ashamed at
the legacies of Columbus -- disease and slavery among
other horrors -- choose to say that Columbus invaded
America in 1492. Once widely accepted, the "fact" of
Columbus's discovery is now in dispute.
Like historical knowledge, mathematical knowledge,
rather than neutral and value-free as is commonly assumed,
is "culture-bound, and imbued with the values of its
makers and their cultural contexts" (P. Ernest, 1991, p.
261), in the process of construction. These cultural
contexts have been, for the most part, those of European
males, and the implications for women do not escape
Ernest, who says:
Underpinning the neutral view of mathematics is 
the cultural perspective and values that 
dominate Western scientific culture. This is 
the culture of rationality, which values reason 
but denigrates feeling. It separates knower 
from known, and objectifies its perceptions, 
removing the knowing subject from the universe 
of discourse. It is a discourse of separation 
and power, which seeks to subjugate nature and 
demands certainty and security from the 
knowledge it legitimates. It represents the 
aggressive masculine half of human nature, which
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has rejected the receptive and compassionate 
feminine half. Out of balance, it leads to 
assertions of power, ever more destructive 
armaments and conflicts, and the rape of the 
environment.
The view of mathematics as male owned or as 
a joint social construction plays a central role 
in sustaining or challenging the male domination 
of Western culture. Success at dehumanized male 
mathematics may diminish our humanity, our 
ability to care, relate, and feel. Sustaining 
the inferiority of ethnic minority groups and 
women through this view of mathematics does 
symbolic violence to all, and subtracts from our 
integrity as human beings. (p. 279)
But what Ernest calls mathematical knowledge is the
rarified knowledge of mathematicians. He notes that the
identification of mathematics with masculinity and power
is a "deeply entrenched cultural discourse" (p. 278) that
explains the underparticipation of women (rather than
inability, or lack of individual knowledge of the value of
mathematics). However, earlier in The Philosophy of
Mathematics Education (1991) Ernest development of the
definitions of objective and subjective knowledge is
itself fixed on the traditional, male-centered view of
mathematics that he later critiques; that this fixation is
a limited and limiting view of mathematics goes
unrecognized.
The view of mathematical knowledge as that which is 
socially accepted allows for the possibility, albeit 
unexplored, of defining mathematical knowledge and 
mathematics in different ways. One such different way is
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to begin with the question, What mathematics is accepted, 
valued, and known by women?
Women's Wavs of Knowing and Mathematics
In Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self,
Voice, and Mind, authors Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger and 
Tarule (1986) "describe the ways of knowing that women 
have cultivated and learned to value" (p. x ) . Although 
the five types of women presented, silent, receiving 
knowers, subjective knowers, procedural knowers, and 
constructing knowers,3 are developed in the broad context 
of knowing, they are applicable to understanding the ways 
that women (may) approach knowing in mathematics.
For women who are silent, there is no understanding, 
nor any hope of seeking to understand knowledge.
Authorities present "that which is known" to non­
authorities, who must accept it. "If authorities do tell 
you what is right, they never tell you why it is right. 
Authorities bellow but do not explain" (Belenky, et al., 
1986, p. 28). For the silent, blind obedience to 
authority is the key to keeping out of trouble, to 
surviving. The silent women in the study had little
3I have changed two of these terms slightly from the 
use in the text: from "received knowers" and "constructed
knowers" to "receiving knowers" and "constructing knowers." 
The sense of action that my usage implies seems more 
consistent with the sense of action in the other terms, as 
well as with the sense of action on the part of the women 
that is conveyed in the descriptions.
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formal education, or else found school to be a place of 
failure. "The silent women . . . were lost in the sea of
words and numbers that flooded their schools. . . . For
them the experience of school only confirmed their fears 
of being 'deaf and dumb'" (p. 34).
Unable to hear the "inner voice," silent women submit 
unquestioningly to the voice of authority. Cut off from 
all sources of intelligence, both internal and external, 
these women see themselves as utterly dependent on others. 
This dependence contributes to an extreme compliance with 
gender stereotypes; women are passive, incompetent.
Although the focus of this study is on knowing, writ 
broadly, the insights gained may be legitimately narrowed 
to mathematical knowing. Female students who are 
mathematically silent are totally disconnected from the 
intellectual experience of mathematical understanding.
They obey the voice of the teacher, and carry the one into 
the next column. It is unnecessary to ask why, simple 
obedience is all that is required or tolerated. Many of 
the silent women in the study suffered physical abuse from 
men. How many girls sit silently in math class as a 
result of psychic abuse, possibly unintentional, from the 
teacher, utterly dependent, the "dumbest one of all"? (p. 
29) ,4
4Having critiqued mainstream research for "blaming the 
teacher," probably herself a victim of mathematics 
education, for perpetuating gender differences, it is
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In contrast to the silent, receiving knowers are able 
to hear the voices of others. Whereas silent knowers want 
to be shown how to do something, receiving knowers are 
able to ask those in authority how to do something, or at 
least listen to them when they explained. Still, like the 
silent women, the receiving women could not imagine 
themselves as generators of knowledge, only as receivers, 
and perhaps as transmitters. When asked where authorities 
get their information, receiving knowers typically refer 
to a higher authority, unable to realize that others have 
the ability to construct knowledge for themselves.
In the mathematics classroom, the receiving knower 
looks forever to the teacher, or perhaps another student, 
for the procedure to follow. Unable to see any ability in 
herself to create a procedure, the receiving knower feels 
betrayed when the teacher asks her to go beyond that which 
is taught. It is likely that many girls are receiving 
knowers of mathematics, a conclusion supported by the data 
which show higher levels of performance in computation for 
girls than anything else, something which public school 
students are shown how to do carefully and repeatedly and 
upon which much emphasis is placed.
This way of knowing is characterized by dualism, 
viewing the world in polarities of right/wrong,
disconcerting to find such a reference here. I ask the 
reader to be patient, and to trust that I will not leave 
the discussion at the current level.
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black/white, we/they, good/bad, true/false. Such is the 
attitude taken towards mathematics in many classrooms.
How many teachers of mathematics are themselves receiving 
knowers, able only to transmit knowledge given to them by 
authorities? Such teachers would be comfortable passing 
mathematical facts and procedures along to students; the 
"right/wrong" aspect of mathematics would be the most 
appealing, useful, and emphasized, for such a teacher.5
The subjective knower is a woman who has shifted to a 
vision of truth as personal, private, and intuited. She 
has moved from dualism to multiplicity, a recognition that 
truth is not absolute and singular, but multiple, 
infinite. "Subjectivist women distrust logic, analysis, 
abstraction, and even language" (p. 71), which they see as 
the territory of men, remote experts, espousing singular 
truths. Many of these women in Belenky's study had 
experienced abuse or incest in the past, and evinced a 
deep distrust of men and male modes of knowing. Others, 
often from advantaged backgrounds, came to subjectivism by 
other routes, but all had ultimately come to distrust the 
opinions of distanced experts. Intuition, a way of knowing 
given primarily (and generally derisively) to women, the
5It is clear that such a teacher could, most likely 
unwittingly, do violence to a student who is totally 
incapable of connecting in the slightest with even this 
aspect of mathematics, who is silent.
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"still small voice" (p. 54) provided truth equal in
stature to the truths of experts.
In mathematics, the shift to subjectivism results in
students who claim to know, but who cannot explain their
knowing. When such students give incorrect answers, they
are dissatisfied with or disinterested in the explanation
of the correct answer. Such students give incorrect
answers often, for they have generally had little or no
guidance in the development of intuition. Knowing
intuitively may be regarded highly among mathematicians
(Davis & Hersh, 1981) , but it is not generally so regarded
by mathematics teachers in schools.
Alternatively, such students might well dismiss
mathematics altogether, rejecting the authority of the
teacher to dictate what is worth knowing. In between,
other students may select from the mathematical
smorgasbord those things which seem worthwhile, leaving
the remainder. In particular, such female students could
be drawn to the content of mathematics in elementary
school, with its focus on utility, on "real life," but
repulsed by the abstractions of higher mathematics. Young
women who feel this way would probably opt out of
mathematics in secondary school:
If I read something, and if it agrees with my 
senses, then I believe it, I know it. If it 
doesn't, I'll say, "Well, you may be right but I 
can't corroborate that." For me, proof is 
usually a sensory one. If you say, "Water 
falls," yeah, I believe it because I've seen it
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happen. If you call it gravity, then I say,
"Oh, is that what you call it?" (Belenky, et 
al., 1986, p. 75)
The procedural knowers described in this study were 
women busy acquiring and applying procedures for obtaining 
and communicating knowledge. Having recognized that 
merely having an opinion or gut feeling is insufficient to 
satisfy others, procedural knowers seek the accepted form 
of knowing. For many, this shift represented a 
diminishing of personal authority; the inner voice has 
become critical of itself. Because these women think 
before they speak, they speak in measured tones or not at 
all. But they are not passively silent, they are waiting 
and reasoning.
Belenky, et al. (1986) identify two types of
procedural knowing, separate and connected. Separate 
knowers are concerned with how students must think in 
order to play the "academic game"; the purpose is 
justification. These women are concerned with knowledge, 
separated from the object of knowledge, and desiring 
mastery over it. Connected knowers, on the other hand, 
are concerned with understanding, and seek a personal 
acquaintance with the object of knowledge. Connected 
knowers seek to know how the other thinks, and the purpose 
is connection rather than justification.
The separate knower solves problems, proves theorems, 
memorizes axioms, follows the accepted form. While
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perhaps capable of excellent work, it is distanced from
the knower, and from the truth. The authors relate one
woman's attitude:
Simone could tell a well-reasoned argument from 
a poorly reasoned one, but she remained 
suspicious of reason. "It's just rhetoric 
[logic]," she said. "It's just a game. It 
doesn't prove anything." The person who won the 
argument was the person with the greater 
rhetorical [logical] skill, not the person 
closer to the truth. (p. 110)
Separate knowing is characteristic of most upper-level
courses in mathematics in secondary schools and in college
and university undergraduate programs.
Connected knowing, in contrast to separate knowing,
stems from believing rather than from doubting. Connected
knowers seek to see the other not in their own terms but
in the other's terms. Connected knowing promises to
reveal truths that are personal, particular, and
experiential; connected knowers must therefore connect to
other people. Seeking knowledge in a connected mode
demands relationships of trust with other people --
trustfulness that they will care for my ideas, and
trustworthiness to care for their ideas. It is helpful
for both separate and connected knowers to meet with
others in groups, but, unlike separate knowers who need
not know each other, connected knowers need to meet in
groups with people they know and trust. However, both
separate and connected knowing is procedural; in both
cases, the aim is to learn how to know, how to think.
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Where separate knowers focus on a discipline (learning to 
think like a mathematician), connected knowers focus on 
the thinking of a person.
Separate and connected knowers who are students of 
mathematics will seek others with whom to share ideas. 
Connected knowers, like separate knowers, will examine and 
criticize the work, but out of a desire to improve it, not 
tear it down or reveal its flaws. In studying the work of 
someone else, the connected knower of mathematics will 
seek to understand the mind at work, how it saw, what it 
thought. The separate knower of mathematics, on the other 
hand, will seek to master the process of justification, of 
proof, recognized in the field.
Of all the women interviewed, only a handful were 
constructing knowers. Unlike procedural knowers, who seek 
mastery of an accepted way of knowing which provides women 
with a sense of power and authority in "a man's world," 
constructing knowers "attempt to integrate knowledge that 
they felt intuitively was personally important with 
knowledge they had learned from others" (Belenky, et al., 
1986, p. 134). Rather than seeing knowing as separate 
from themselves, these women recognize that all knowledge 
is constructed, and that the knower is intimately 
connected to that which is known.
Because knowledge is a construction of the person who 
knows, constructing knowers associate knowledge with the
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context of knowing. Theories are models that approximate
experience, which is necessarily more complex; theories
are not "truth."
In science you don't really want to say that 
something's true. You realize that you're 
dealing with a model. Our models are always 
simpler than the real world. The real world is 
more complex than anything we can create. We're 
simplifying everything so that we can work with 
it, but the thing is really more complex. When 
you try to describe things, you're leaving the 
truth because you're oversimplifying. (Belenky, 
et al., 1986, p. 138)
The process of simplification, decisions about what to
leave out, to gloss over, is bound to its context,
spatially and temporally coupled to a specific moment and
knower.
Clearly, the work of those insightful "geniuses," 
university mathematicians, is representative of 
constructed knowing. In a study by Dorothy Buerk (1985), 
participants at a mathematics colloquium stressed the 
creative side of mathematics, the part that requires 
intuitive judgement, as most descriptive of how 
mathematicians do mathematics. The formal aspects of 
mathematics, proofs and so on, were reserved for 
professional presentations, textbooks, and classrooms; 
they represent the way in which mathematicians present 
their work to the world. As constructing knowers, these 
mathematicians are able to hear the voice of intuition, to 
recognize that which is important, to see patterns and 
make connections. But equally important, these
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constructing knowers are able to draw upon the formal work 
of others, to use objective knowledge to inform, guide, 
and support intuition, and ultimately to couch personal 
subjective knowledge in professionally acceptable ways.
The descriptions of female knowers examined here 
contrast sharply with the words of Noddings (1990a) cited 
earlier:
Our judgement [of truth] is not based on raw 
authority. . . .  We do not accept [the 
mathematicians'] word simply because their 
office confers unassailable authority. Rather 
we accept [the mathematical statement], 
tentatively, because we know that mathematicians 
belong to a community that subjects all 
knowledge claims to careful scrutiny, and the 
criteria for such scrutiny are laid out for all 
the community to see. (pp. 11-12)
While for Noddings, a former teacher of mathematics, the
simple acceptance of authority may be insufficient, for
the silent or receiving knowers, simple acceptance is all
that is demanded or accepted by authority; for these
knowers, rejection of the authority of the mathematician
is unthinkable. The position taken by Noddings renders
these learners silent, even as it allows for their
improper subjective construction of mathematical
knowledge. Likewise, the complete rejection of authority
qua authority by subjective knowers is obscured, and the
integration of connected and separate knowing by
constructing knowers is only hinted at by Noddings. This
statement, presented as the alternative to rote learning,
is made from the position of procedural knower.
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For female students of mathematics, the work of 
Belenky, et al., (1986) is potentially empowering, for it
provides avenues for knowing not acknowledged in typical 
first generation research. In traditional research, 
students either know or do not know mathematics; either 
they elect to pursue mathematics or they do not; they 
either like and value mathematics or they do not. The 
categories that developed out of this study, however, 
provide us with a more complex model of mathematical 
knowing than is currently available; knowing mathematics 
is not "either/or," as traditional models have led us to 
believe.
But even a more sophisticated understanding of how 
women approach mathematical knowing does not address what 
it is that women are coming to know. This requires a look 
at what constitutes mathematics, a fundamental question 
that has not yet been addressed satisfactorily.
Women's Knowing in Mathematics
Earlier, I used a Venn diagram to illustrate the 
relationship between subjective and objective knowledge in 
mathematics. In Figure 2, I have added a third set which 
represents the knowledge that is applicable to a 
particular branch of mathematics, perhaps combinatorics or 
topology. For the mathematician interested in this field, 
the knowledge in this new set is particularly important,
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although what lies outside the set is also vital as the 
mathematician seeks to construct new knowledge -
Thus far, drawing the diagrams has been relatively 
simple; the next step, however, is more difficult. How 
shall we represent the relationship between the sets of 
mathematical knowledge of different groups of knowers of 
mathematics? Figure 3 represents one way to relate the 
knowledge, both objective and subjective, of 
mathematicians to that of secondary and elementary school 
students respectively.6 Because individuals who possess 
doctorates in mathematics clearly have greater subjective 
and objective knowledge than students in public schools, 
the outer ring encloses each of the other two; for the 
same reason, the set of knowledge of secondary school 
students encloses that of elementary school students.
It is not immediately clear, however that such a 
representation is an accurate depiction of the 
relationships. While the assumption that mathematicians 
possess more mathematical knowledge than secondary school 
students is acceptable, the assumption that the 
corresponding ring should completely enclose that of 
secondary school is not. Students at lower levels in 
mathematics learn many things which would not be
60f course, many other distinctions, showing the sets 
of knowledge of persons at various levels of 
education/understanding could be drawn. However, since 
this is given for illustrative purposes, I have elected to 
keep the diagrams as simple as possible.
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Figure 2 . Venn diagram illustrating the relationship 
between objective knowledge, subjective knowledge, and 
knowledge in a particular area of mathematics.
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Figure 3 . One way to show the relationship between the 
mathematical knowledge of mathematicians, secondary school 
students, and elementary school students.
considered "mathematical knowledge" by the community of 
mathematicians. An example of such knowledge is the 
conversion factor used to change inches to centimeters. 
This type of knowledge was probably once known by the 
mathematician, and since forgotten, or else now discounted 
as not "really" mathematics. Second, students are often 
taught things that, to the mathematician, are not really 
true, or that are true only in a certain sense of which 
the student is unaware. For example, students in algebra 
classes are commonly taught that a function is a set of 
ordered pairs where each value of x has one and only one 
corresponding y value, and that they can use a vertical 
line to test the graph of a relation to see if it is a 
function. (The relation is a function if the vertical 
line never intersects the graph in two points 
simultaneously.) But mathematicians know that this is the 
definition for "x as a function of y," which imposes 
narrower constraints than the term "function." Figure 4 
illustrates the assumption that public school students 
possess mathematical knowledge that differs from that of 
the mathematician. However, students in early elementary 
school are often told that they should always subtract the 
smaller number from the larger. Since they have not yet 
encountered the concept of negativity, such teaching is 
consistent with the desired outcomes of problems given to 
these students. For the high school student, however,
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Figure 4 . Another way to show the relationship between 
the mathematical knowledge of mathematicians, secondary 
school students, and elementary school students.
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this simplistic approach to subtraction is often 
inappropriate for the situation. Therefore, Figure 5 
illustrates the assumption that persons at each level 
possess knowledge that is not appropriately included at 
higher or lower levels.
At this point, it is necessary to reconsider this 
examination of the mathematical knowledge of different 
groups in light of the process by which mathematical 
knowledge become objective. For Paul Ernest (1991), 
mathematical knowledge is that of mathematicians; by 
expanding this discussion to other groups, I have 
implicitly defined other communities that accept certain 
knowledge as mathematical. In Figures 3, 4, and 5, these 
implicit communities consist of teachers, textbook 
authors, and curriculum planners, among others. What 
other communities might there be, and what "counts" as 
mathematical knowledge to them?
In these last three diagrams it is not the community 
of mathematicians that is the approving group, but a wider 
community; that is, mathematical knowledge in this sense 
is that which is known and accepted by most members of 
society. Many different diagrams could be drawn to 
illustrate the relationships between the mathematical 
knowledge held by members of various groups; depending on 
the groups selected, the amount and nature of the 
intersections would vary. Because acceptance of knowledge
Figure 5 . Still another way to show the relationship 
between the mathematical knowledge of mathematicians, 
secondary school students, and elementary school students.
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by the social group defines the knowledge for that group, 
it follows that groups would have some mathematical 
knowledge that differed in some significant way(s) from 
that of other groups. For these other groups, some of the 
knowledge would be unknown, disregarded, or rejected, 
depending on the particularities of that group's 
relationship to mathematics and mathemticians. Because 
the mathematical participation of women as a cultural 
group differs from that of men as a cultural group, it is 
reasonable to assume that, in general, the mathematical 
knowledge of women differs in some ways from that of men.
Historically, mathematics has been something in which 
men have engaged. In addition to "pure" mathematics, 
disciplines such as physics, engineering, computer 
science, and medicine are generally regarded as 
mathematical, both because of the level of use of 
mathematical techniques and formulas and that these are 
things in which men dominate. But knowledge that certain 
activities are mathematical and others are not is socially 
constructed; like mathematical knowledge, it has its basis 
in the agreement of the community. It is my contention 
that the mathematical underpinnings of activities which 
are seen as "masculine" are recognized, but "feminine" 
activity is rarely given serious consideration for 
mathematical underpinnings.
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Because the foundational assumption is that women are 
not mathematical, the mathematical underpinnings of female 
activity have gone unnoticed. Beginning with the 
assumption that many of the things which predominantly 
women do will have mathematical aspects allows us to see 
these mathematical aspects; failing to hold that 
assumption obscures them.
Something like hairdressing, which is largely done by 
and to women, is clearly not mathematical in a 
traditionally-understood sense. Aside from the obvious 
role of numbers in paying for services (which could make 
any occupation mathematical), mathematics and hairdressing 
are not related. But I will argue that hairdressing has 
mathematical aspects, in the sense that it requires a 
sophisticated understanding of space, and of movement in 
space. In short, hairdressing requires visuo- 
spatialization abilities that are unrecognized.
Some of the data on the relationship between 
spatialization and mathematical ability were presented in 
chapter 2. In general, the evidence has pointed to 
greater spatialization ability among males; females have 
tended to score lower on tests of visual spatialization 
than their male peers, which has been used to explain 
gender differences in mathematics. This line of research 
has been critiqued on the basis that the relationship 
between spatialization ability and mathematical
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achievement has not been firmly established, and it is not 
sufficient to explain observed discrepancies in 
mathematical performance.
For the moment, I am willing to accept the notion 
that spatialization ability is an important component of 
mathematical ability.7 I am not willing, on the basis of 
contrived and abstracted test items, to accept the 
conclusion that women are not as capable as men in this 
area. The example of the hairdresser will show why.
Styling hair, especially changing from one style to 
another, is more than the mere cutting of individual hairs 
or even sections of hair. Each person's hair is 
different, and will respond differently to different 
treatments. A pageboy cut, for example, will not look the 
same with straight hair as it will with curly hair. Hair 
that possesses some natural curl will be straighter when 
it is long, as the additional weight pulls the hair down. 
When a stylist cuts a customer's hair, the hair is 
generally wet, which alters its behavior and appearance. 
Wet hair is flatter and straighter than dry hair.
In cutting a customer's hair, the stylist must be 
able to envision how the hair will look when it is
7For the Greeks, mathematics was geometry, the study 
of space. In a more recent example, Benoit Mandelbrot, 
father of fractals, gained admission to the prestigious 
Ecole Polytechnique in Paris by using his spatialization 
ability to answer correctly enough questions to pass the 
admissions examination for which he was woefully 
underprepared (Gleick, 1987).
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finished and dry. In order to achieve the desired look, 
the hair is sectioned, and each section is cut in the 
manner necessary. Often, this means that sections of hair 
are pulled away from the scalp, directly down, up or at an 
angle. The ends of the section are then cut, and the line 
of cut may be perpendicular to the hair shaft, or at 
another angle. The manipulation of hair, comb, and 
scissors by the hairdresser is a three-dimensional, 
geometrical dance that results, one hopes, in the perfect 
haircut.
There is not reason to assume that the mathematical 
aspects of haircutting are necessarily obvious to the 
hairstylist at work in the salon. What is being addressed 
is the failure of academics interested in gender and 
mathematics to identify the mathematical underpinnings of 
non-male activities. Beginning with the assumption that 
women are not mathematical eliminates such "feminine" 
occupations invisible to the scutiny of researchers; this 
ommission contributes to the affirmation of the initial 
assumption.
The research of Jean Lave (1988) into the arithmetic 
practices of grocery shoppers and dieters also sheds light 
on women's ways of knowing and using mathematics.
Although not specifically focused on women, only three of 
the 35 participants were men, so the insights gained are 
applicable here. The participants in the supermarket
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study were observed in the process of shopping and were 
given a variety of mathematical exercises in the home, 
including an arithmetic test8 and a best-buy simulation.
In the grocery store, these shoppers performed at the 
average level of 98% accuracy, compared to the mean level 
of accuracy of 93% on the best-buy simulation and 59% on 
the arithmetic test. Lave credits this difference to the 
control that people feel in the supermarket, exercising 
options to define, re-define and abandon problems, over 
the lack of control experienced in the school-like 
environment of the arithmetic test. The complex 
mathematical knowledge displayed in the supermarket is 
connected to other knowledge, like what the family should 
or will eat, whereas a test of arithmetical knowledge 
calls for a display of separate knowledge, the ability to 
reproduce the procedures of the discipline correctly.
Intuition, Mathematics, and Women
In mathematics, connections between diverse fields 
are often first recognized through the intuitive sense of 
the mathematician (Davis & Hersh, 1981; P. Ernest, 1991) .
In physics, recognition of the ring structure of benzene 
by Friedrich August von Kekule was prompted by his dream
8Although the researchers preferred to call this an 
"exercise," the "just plain folks" of the study referred to 
it as a test, and responded to it as if it were a test.
This response on the part of the people taking the test 
prompted Lave to admit that that is what it became.
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of a snake swallowing its own tail.9 Philosopher of 
science Paul Feyerabend (1988) claims that no progress can 
be made in science "without a frequent dismissal of reason 
. . . [for] even within science reason cannot and should
not be allowed to be comprehensive and it must often be 
overruled, or eliminated, in favour of other agencies" (p. 
164), one of which is intuition.
Conventional wisdom has it that women have intuitive 
abilities different from, and perhaps superior to, those 
of men,, Sometimes a complement, often raised to suggest 
that women have correspondingly inferior analytical 
abilities, this bit of conventional wisdom may offer a new 
window through which to consider the mathematical 
attainment, participation, and achievement of female 
learners.
While rejecting the notion that there is something 
directly related to biological gender that places limits 
on the ability of an individual or group to "be 
intuitive," I do wish to entertain the idea that, due to 
dominant perceptions rooted in shared cultural
9Weisberg (1986) notes that the German word Halbschlaf 
used by Kekule, often translated as "dream," may also be 
translated as "reverie" or "doze," which "would mean that 
he was not really sleeping, but rather was lost in thought" 
(p. 32). Weisberg also makes much of Kekule's admonition 
that scientists not make their dreams known prior to 
working out via "wakened understanding." Although Weisberg 
is attempting to undermine the notion of intuition, he 
actually clarifies the importance of intuition in 
scientific thought.
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understandings of "female intuitions," women enjoy a 
certain freedom to consider alternative ways of knowing. 
Although de-legitimated as "women's ways," these 
alternatives are acceptable in a variety of contexts.10
If so, this is a critical insight for researchers 
interested in the mathematical learning of female students 
in particular. As women, our intuition is something which 
the dominant culture has taught us to privilege in 
ourselves, and the perception of mathematics as "non- 
intuitive" (a false perception, based upon a misleading 
presentation of the field by mathematicians) may help to 
explain the overwhelming avoidance of mathematics that is 
characteristic of most learners, especially of females.
The idea of intuition has its roots in human 
prehistory. Valued highly in all cultures except the 
rational and scientific West (Noddings & Shore, 1984), the 
importance of intuition as a way of knowing in mathematics 
is currently enjoying increased interest. Philosophers of 
mathematics Philip Davis and Reuben Hersh (1981) note that 
all standard philosophies of mathematics "rely in an 
essential way on some notion of intuition" (p. 3 93) but 
that all fail to define intuition. Furthermore, when 
intuition is addressed directly, it is treated as
10The acceptability of intuitive knowing seems to 
increase as the context of knowing becomes more "feminine." 
For example, "mother's intuition" receives popular praise, 
as it supports a woman's connectedness to the family.
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superfluous to the actual work of mathematics, a treatment 
to which Davis and Hersh object. As a way of knowing, the 
stature of intuition varies on a continuum of 
desirability; it may be a distraction to be avoided, or an 
aid to be cultivated, or a bit of both.
For absolutist philosophies, intuition is 
particularly troubling. In trying to maintain infallible 
foundations, absolutism cannot resolve the mystery of 
intuitive knowing; by concerning itself only with the 
justification of knowledge, absolutism is able to maintain 
the false impression that intuition is optional. In 
seeking to link genesis with justification, however, 
social constructivism moves intuition from the margins of 
the discourse to the center.
This centering of intuition as an indispensable way 
of generating subjective knowledge may have important 
implications for women's knowing in mathematics.
Throughout history, there is evidence of a "distinct and 
persistent notion" of an intuitive mode of knowing that is 
specific to women (Noddings & Shore, 1984, p. 38) .
Although these authors are unwilling to take "feminine 
intuition" as more than superstition in the absence of no 
more evidence than unsubstantiated folklore and cultural 
stereotyping, the pervasiveness of the idea of women's 
special intuitive abilities makes it a fictional truth 
which has material effect in the world of real women
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(Walkerdine, 1990). Biological, psychological or 
anthropological confirmation is not needed, for the 
continued cultural retelling of this truthful fiction 
makes it real, and thereby legitimates a way of knowing 
that is potentially powerful for women.
Affirming the role of intuition in mathematical 
knowing allows for the power of intuition to be tapped, 
which is particularly significant in the mathematics 
education of women. Devalued, mathematical intuition is 
not explored or encouraged in students; placing high value 
on the use and development of intuitive understanding 
provides a new avenue for women to enter into mathematical 
knowing. At present, intuitive knowing is neither 
explored nor encouraged in mathematics instruction, so 
students of mathematics have few if any opportunities to 
develop and expand their intuitive abilities. If 
intuition were given a more prominent and valued position 
within mathematics teaching and learning, the social 
fiction of women's special intuitive abilities could 
positively impact the level of women's participation in 
mathematics. By denying the place of intuition in 
mathematical knowing, mathematics educators perpetuate the 
fiction that mathematics is anti-intuitive and anti­
female .
For the mathematician, intuitive knowing generates 
subjective certainty, the conviction that subjective
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knowledge is true, which forms the basis of both the 
valuing of intuition and suspicion of it, for it may be 
correct or incorrect. Although treated tentatively by the 
knower, intuitions are vested with the power of certainty 
that makes abandoning faulty intuitions difficult at 
times, which generates suspicion about all intuitions.
This subjective certainty of the knower is balanced by the 
objective uncertainty of the community. The intuitive 
sense is convinced, but the community remains skeptical; 
the tension between certainty and uncertainty drives the 
attempt to prove or refute the knowledge that is intuited.
Throughout written history, the idea of intuition is 
strongly connected to the visual sense. From the Latin 
verb intueri, "to look at," intuition is mental seeing, 
looking with the "mind's eye." The strength of this 
connection between intuition and seeing is confirmed by 
historical accounts of intuition (Noddings & Shore, 1984) 
as well as common cultural references: the "flash" of
intuition that "illuminates" and allows understanding.
But, for women, other sensory metaphors may be more 
important. In the interviews of Belenky, et al., (1986),
the women were far more likely to use an aural metaphor to 
describe their knowing than a visual one. In sharp 
contrast to visual metaphors or "knowing as seeing," aural 
metaphors imply a closeness, a connection, an interaction 
between knower and known. Knowing with the "mind's eye"
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suggests a passive observation of that which is known, of 
distance, perspective, disconnection. In order to hear, 
one must come close and listen for the whisper of 
intuition.
Knowing in mathematics is strongly connected to the 
visual, to "seeing" as understanding or knowing. But the 
visual is separated, in contrast to the connectedness of 
the aural. For women, the perception of mathematical 
knowledge as separate from themselves, to be received from 
outside authorities, precludes the development of 
subjective knowing, of listening to the inner voice.
Continuing to use a visual metaphor exclusively for 
intuitive knowing places limits on the level of connection 
between knower and known. Coupling an aural metaphor with 
the visual one brings knower and known into closer 
proximity; one must be close in order to hear the voice of 
intuition. This sense of connection can be made even 
stronger, closer, and more connected by adding other 
sensory metaphors: "turning an idea over and over in the
mind," "grasping a concept," or "smelling something 
fishy." Taken together, visual and aural metaphors of 
knowing in mathematics multiply the avenues for developing 
instruction in mathematics.
The practice of mathematicians as they do mathematics 
is closely associated with connection. Dorothy Buerk
(1985) presented excerpts of Carol Gilligan's book, In a
142
Different Voice (1982), to participants in a colloquium of 
the mathematics department of Ithaca College, juxtaposing 
abstract, formal reasoning and thinking with concrete, 
informal reasoning and thinking. The consensus of the 
group was that the informal examples represented the way 
mathematicians do mathematics, while the formal examples 
represented the way mathematics is presented in school. 
"For many, especially many women, this unfortunate 
disparity takes the life out of mathematics and 
mathematics out of their lives" (p. 64).
Legitimating Intuition in Mathematics Education:
Connected Teaching
Like knowers, teachers' styles range on a continuum 
between highly separate and deeply connected. Belenky, et 
al., (1986) contrast the metaphor of a "teacher-banker" of
Paulo Freire (1971) with the idea of a teacher-midwife. 
Where the teacher-banker seeks to deposit the knowledge 
she holds into her students, the teacher-midwife "assists 
[students] in the emergence of consciousness" (Belenky, et 
al., 1986, p. 218), not thinking for them, but providing 
encouragement and the assistance of her own knowledge as 
students give birth to their own thoughts. For female 
students in mathematics, this difference is critical.
In the classroom, the banking-teacher uses a separate 
style. The content and structure of the lesson are well- 
developed, and the reasoning is airtight. Although
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students may be invited to disagree, to probe the facts or
arguments presented, the teacher has composed them in
advance, taking great care to prepare the best lesson
possible. One student, asked to recount a "really
powerful learning experience," recalled her first
introductory science class from college. Belenky, et al.,
(1986) provide an example:
The professor marched into the lecture hall, 
placed upon his desk a large jar filled with 
dried beans, and invited the students to guess 
how many beans the jar contained. After 
listening to an enthusiastic chorus of wildly 
inarticulate estimates the professor smiled a 
thin, dry smile, revealed the correct answer, 
and announced, "You have just learned an 
important lesson about science. Never trust the 
evidence of your own senses." (p. 191)
Separate teachers possess knowledge students do not, which
they are charged with dispensing. In this case, the
professor wished to motivate his students to value the
scientific method and instrumentation over the evidence of
the senses alone. The effect on the woman in the study,
however, was an unending aversion to science: she dropped
the course that day and never looked back.
The effect of separate teaching on female students is
very often diminishing and humiliating. Separate teaching
does not confirm the student's ability to know; the
teacher is the authority. This renders students "dumb and
dependent" (p. 193), looking forever to the teacher for
knowledge. In time, the student will also become a
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knower, and will join the community of scholars, but only 
after she is no longer a student.
Belenky and colleagues note that separate teaching 
has particularly detrimental results for women in science, 
which can easily be extended to include mathematics. As a 
historically male discipline, college science courses are 
usually taught by men. In the introductory courses that 
many students take, the lectures consist of a "series of 
syllabine statements" (p. 215), a polished product that 
only a professor could create. The perception of the 
science professor as the giver of truth was so strong that 
one woman concluded that "science is not a creation of the 
human mind!" (p. 216).
In contrast, the midwife-teacher uses a connected 
mode that begins by recognizing and valuing the knowledge 
that the student already possesses and her capacity for 
learning new truths herself. The authors provide another 
example:
The teacher came into class carrying a large 
cardboard cube. She placed it on the desk in 
front of her and asked the class what it was.
They said it was a cube. She asked what a cube 
was, and they said a cube contained six equal 
square sides. She asked how they knew that this 
object contained six equal square sides. By 
looking at it, they said. "But how do you 
know?" the teacher asked again. She pointed to 
the side facing her, therefore invisible to the 
students; then she lifted the cube and pointed 
to the side that had been face down on the desk, 
and, therefore, also invisible. "We can't look 
at all six sides of a cube at once, can we? So 
we can't exactly see a cube. But you know it 
not just because you have eyes but because you
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have intelligence. You invent the sides you 
cannot see. You use your intelligence to create 
the 'truth' about cubes." (p. 192).
Like the science teacher above, this philosophy teacher
planned to teach the students the skills of philosophical
analysis, the tools of her trade, but she begins with the
affirmation of the students' abilities to construct some
truth. Where none of the students in the science classes
possessed the desired knowledge, all the members of the
philosophy class knew that the cube had six equal square
sides. "Midwife-teachers help students deliver their
words to the world, and they use their own knowledge to
put the students into conversation with other voices --
past and present -- in the culture" (p. 219).
In separate classes, the flow of the discourse is
unidirectional and linear, from the teacher to the
students. In the terminology of Paul Ernest (1991), the
aim is to infuse the objective knowledge the teacher holds
into the subjective knowledge of the students. In
connected classes, however, the flow is a cycle of
confirmation-evocation-confirmation between the
teacher-student and the students-teachers.11 In this
cycle, knowledge is possessed and gain by all participants
“ This terminology is used by Belenky and colleagues 
to emphasize that everyone in a connected class is a 
learner, although the teacher occupies a special role that 
carries both authority and responsibility. While all 
possess the power to understand and to learn, the teacher 
is not just another student.
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in the process. Rather than seeking to ascertain what 
knowledge is missing or incorrect in the minds of 
students, the connected teacher begins with the belief 
that all students already possess important knowledge and 
ways of learning -- the teaching cycle is based on this 
valued, prior knowledge, and seeks to challenge and expand 
it.
Paul Ernest (1991) notes three levels of mathematical 
knowledge, formal, informal and social;12 in the West, 
these are valued in decreasing order. In mathematics 
classes, as Buerk (1985) showed, it is the highly valued, 
separate formal level that dominates; informal activity 
occurs behind the scenes, never revealed to students. The 
activities of creation are necessarily informal, giving 
them lower status than the formal display.
As a social construct, this hierarchy is also subject 
to scrutiny and rejection by the community, proposed by 
Ernest. Social constructivism acknowledges all learners 
-- women and men -- as creators, each constructing 
subjective knowledge of mathematics through the process of 
posing and solving problems. Because the mathematical 
activity of all learners involves the posing and solving 
of problems, it is different from the activity of 
professional mathematicians only in that mathematicians
12The level of the social, addressed above, is left 
unaddressed by Ernest, as if its meaning were universal.
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are those who have obtained "the critical assent of the 
mathematical community [to] produce bona fide new 
mathematical knowledge" (P. Ernest, 1991, p. 283).
To create this kind of learning environment, the 
teacher must relinquish power over the answers, methods, 
and choice of content of the lesson and allow students to 
explore the landscape of mathematics, under the teacher's 
guidance and protection. Although the teacher may propose 
the initial situation, the definition of the problem and 
the development of the solution method will also involve 
student responsibility. This sharing of responsibility 
provides students with a connection to their learning that 
is not present in a situation where teachers, textbook 
authors and governmental bodies impose strict educational 
guidelines on learning.
In order for this problem posing and solving approach 
to function in a way that is empowering for women, 
however, free investigation must be linked to a 
fallibilist view of mathematics. This view de-centers the 
unique and correct answers so critical to absolutist 
philosophies and instead emphasizes that all students are 
mathematical knowledge creators, necessarily possessed of 
mathematical understanding and capable of creating more.
In short, it is connected, and as such does not silence 
female (or male) learners of mathematics.
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Conclusion
This chapter has focused on the importance of the 
definition of mathematics on the learning of women, and on 
how women may come to know mathematics in ways other than 
those that are currently legitimated. We have seen that 
the way in which mathematics is defined -- either as 
absolute, separate, and logical, or as fallible, connected 
and intuitive -- has profound consequences for both the 
form and content of mathematics teaching. This in turn 
has serious implications for female mathematics students.
The result of the dominance of absolutist 
understandings of mathematics is separate teaching and 
knowing. As Belenky, et al., (1986) demonstrate, this
teaching mode has severe consequences for women as 
knowers, particularly in mathematics. But shifting to a 
more connected mode necessitates abandoning absolutism for 
fallibilism, and giving up claims to absolute certainty in 
mathematical knowing.
This shift in philosophy promises a truly empowering, 
emancipatory mathematics education for women. Developing 
specific pedagogy will require research that focuses on 
how women come to understand and use mathematics -- 
something we clearly do -- not in order to bring them to 
the same place as men, but to facilitate their development 
as knowing creators of mathematics, to help them see 
themselves as constructing knowers.
The classroom processes needed to assist women in 
moving from silence to construction can only be made clear 
through research grounded in the assumption that women, 
like men, can and do knowingly create mathematical 
knowledge. The direction and possibilities for such 
research are explored in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5
GENDER STUDIES IN MATHEMATICS: 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Feminist work in education is divided mainly 
into first and second generation thinking, and 
so far the two have not engaged in productive 
dialogue to construct . . . third generation
thought. (Noddings, 1990, p. 407)
Rather than mathematics for all, the outcome of 
centering the human activity of mathematics is 
mathematics by all. A "problem posing pedagogy 
. . . is proposed because it empowers all
learners, not a deficient minority" (P. Ernest, 
1991, p. 292)
Chaos has taken a beating in these 
pathologically normal and rational times. 
("Northern Exposure," July 5, 1993)
In the work of the first generation, researchers have 
sought answers to questions that center on the ways in 
which women differ from, and are inferior to, men. 
Conversely, researchers of the second generation have 
rejected female/male comparisons in favor of focussing on 
the special qualities of women. For the most part, 
research in mathematics education has parallelled that of 
education as a whole: the majority of research is first
generation, with a smattering of second generation 
research. By and large, little third generation work has 
been attempted, work that seeks to synthesize the 
knowledge gained from the first and second generations
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(Noddings, 1990b). The aim of this chapter is to point 
the way to the beginning of such a synthesis.
Thus far, I have recounted events of significance in 
the development of wide-spread interest into mathematics 
and gender. Beginning with the seminal work of Elizabeth 
Fennema, I traced the research findings of the first 
generation; this general history raised questions about 
the energy driving the work of these researchers and 
supporting their focus on classroom intervention to direct 
and control educational outcomes. In partial answer to 
this question, I then turned to the launch of Sputnik and 
the sweeping and lasting changes in social attitudes 
toward education and technological progress that it 
provoked. Having glimpsed the questionable and disturbing 
underpinnings of the first generation project, I sought in 
chapter 4 to explore the possibilities for women's knowing 
in mathematics that does not rely on a masculine norm.
This project is clearly unfinished, for too little primary 
data has been gathered to lend needed strength to this 
project. However, it is not necessary, perhaps not wise, 
for such data to be gathered without considering the 
possible directions, applications, and implications of 
future research.
In addition to the need for a new research agenda, 
chapter 4 pointed to different ways of knowing, teaching, 
and learning mathematics; separate ways were shown to
152
dominate mathematics classrooms, if not mathematical 
knowing. This chapter will begin exploring the 
implications for a mathematics curriculum of connected 
knowing and teaching. Linked to this will be the 
development of mathematical intuition, and the chapter 
will also suggest changes in teaching and in research that 
this shift in focus may entail.
Connected Teaching in the Mathematics Classroom
At present, separate teaching dominates the majority
of mathematics classrooms. As the work of Belenky et al.
(1986) shows, this style of teaching and the knowledge
that it emphasizes has particularly damaging consequences
for female students in the sciences, including
mathematics. In recent statements on teaching, the
National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (1989, 1991b,
1991d) has recommended a move from separate teaching
toward connected teaching, replacing the image of the
teacher as a banker to something more like that of the
midwife. In a collection of presentation materials sent
to mathematics educators, one transparency master stated:
To reach the goal of developing mathematical 
power for all students requires the creation of 
a curriculum and an environment, in which 
teaching and learning are to occur, that are 
very different from much of current practice.
[We need] elementary and secondary teachers who 
are more proficient in selecting mathematical 
tasks to engage students' interests and 
abilities; . . . orchestrating classroom
discourse in ways that promote the investigation
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and growth of mathematical ideas; . . . seeking,
and helping students seek, connections to 
previous and developing knowledge. (1991c, p.
1 )
The midwife teacher knows she cannot give birth for her 
students; she uses her greater mathematical knowledge and 
past experiences to assist students in giving birth to 
mathematical ideas that are new to them.
But this will not necessarily transform students from 
procedural knowers to constructing knowers. Although NCTM 
does concede that students should pursue hunches and 
guesses, the "vision" of mathematics teaching presented in 
recent publications deals with nonrational ways of knowing 
implicitly rather than explicitly. In Curriculum and 
Evaluation Standards for School Mathematics (1989) four 
standards are common to all grades levels: Mathematics as
Problem Solving; Mathematics as Reasoning, Mathematics as 
Communication; and Mathematical Connections. In the 
teaching and learning examples in this document (as well 
as in Professional Standards for Teaching Mathematics 
[NCTM, 1991]) drawing on, developing, and extending the 
rational powers of students are emphasized. Teachers 
present mathematical situations to capture or further 
students' interests and to increase their ability to make 
and evaluate conjectures, to solve problems using 
mathematical techniques and concepts, to make connections 
between mathematical ideas and to employ mathematical 
understandings in other disciplines, and to share
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information and ideas with others engaged in similar 
tasks.
The emphasis here is on learning mathematics through 
engaging in mathematical activity. Currently, most 
mathematics students are passive receivers of information 
(Carpenter, Corbitt, Kepner, Lindquist, & Reys, 1981;
NCTM, 1991c); the new vision depicts students as active 
receivers of information. NCTM has attempted to make the 
shift to connected teaching, and has recognized the 
centrality of subjective knowing to doing mathematics.
What they have failed to recognize is that constructing 
knowers, like mathematicians, are able to use their 
intuitive, nonrational abilities in addition to their 
powers of reason.
Intuition is a critical part of knowing 
constructively and may require that "analytic thinking 
[be] suspended or placed in a subservient role. Perhaps 
the right advice is to 'stop thinking' and 'just do' . . .
with the intention and expectation of understanding" 
(Noddings & Shore, 1984, p. 83). Placing too much 
emphasis on reasoning in the classroom may deter the 
generation of intuitive modes; the whisper of intuition 
cannot be heard if we are attending to the voice of 
reason. Reaching the goals that NCTM has set requires 
cultivating intuition in mathematics, but developing
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intuition and intuitive modes of knowing requires taking
steps that have not yet been endorsed.
The function of intuition that makes it necessary for
reaching these goals is that of experience enabler. In
the constructivist view, adopted by NCTM with respect to
rationality, intuition precedes experience, makes
experience possible, provides experience with direction
and motivation, and allows for the constructing of
knowledge from experience. "Without intuition, . . .
experience would be something merely 'had,' not something
anticipated, organized, chosen, evaluated" (Noddings &
Shore, 1984). The description of experience devoid of
intuition, as something merely "had," is chillingly
similar to that of many mathematics classrooms; these
reactions of students to mathematical learning experiences
are similar to those depicted in the vision of NCTM. In
order to achieve this in the classroom, cultivating
intuitive modes of learning will be critical.
How can intuitive modes be cultivated in the
classroom? Noddings and Shore provide a clue:
The first and most obvious thing we can do to 
encourage intuitive activity is to acknowledge 
intuitive capacity and the reality of intuitive 
modes. As teachers we can share with our 
students information about intuitive activity, 
our own intuitive experiences, and biographical 
accounts of intuitive thinking that has produced 
admirable results. (p. 91)
We can discuss ways individuals and cultures have
developed to enhance intuition, like listening to or
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playing music, fasting, meditating, or engaging in 
physical activity.1 This treatment of intuition in the 
classroom should encourage students to experiment with 
ways to enhance intuition that are suitable to them and 
the development of specific practices designed to enhance 
intuitive modes. However, participation in enhancement 
activities must be voluntary and be conducted in a 
trusting relationship between teachers, students, and 
parents. Because of the intensely personal nature of 
intuitive engagement, it is particularly crucial that 
enhancement routines not signify membership in a 
particular group or acceptance of a particular set of 
beliefs.
Because attending to intuition requires a willing 
release of self, cultivating intuition in the classroom 
requires "securing the active participation of the 
student" (p. 123) not only in the construction of 
knowledge but also in constructing the purposes for 
knowing by engaging with students to consider why learning 
is important and desirable. It is necessary to heal the 
split in students between obedience and rebelliousness 
before intuition can flourish, to consider questions about 
why something is to be pursued before engaging in the
Noddings and Shore also advocate discussing the use 
of "mind altering substances" (p. 92) by various cultures 
and associated problems. This provides a basis for 
exploring the topic with students without resorting to 
moralizing or preaching.
pursuit. Instead of ordered to engage with, or at least 
endure, the presented material, students are invited to 
see, to understand, to explore, to hear. The rewards of 
such invitations to engage are well worth the care 
necessary to develop ways of inviting students to learn 
mathematics. However, there are ominous implications for 
classroom practice: In the extreme case, students may
refuse engagement; more likely, and perhaps more 
frightening, the intuitive leaps generated by this 
engagement may take students in directions for which 
teachers are unprepared because such leaps are 
indeterminate. Cultivating intuitive modes of learning 
involves introducing disruptions in understanding, the 
disequilibrium that provokes students to engage. The 
results of such disruption are inherently unpredictable 
(Doll, 1993).
This unpredictable and therefore uncontrollable 
aspect of intuition has prevented explicit endorsement of 
intuition as a means of knowing mathematics. Coupled with 
the powerful image of mathematics as formal and rational 
in the didactic tradition, the dynamic nature of intuitive 
learning seems dangerously chaotic. But as Doll (1993) 
shows, far from being a destructive force, the self- 
organization that arises from perturbations of stability 
in the classroom drives learning. Rather than being set 
in advance, the goals, purposes and objectives of learning
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emerge from within action as action emerges from purpose. 
As direction emerges from engagement specific plans are 
conjointly determined by the teacher and the student.
This requires flexibility in planning, and presents 
students the opportunity to come to a depth of 
understanding of subject matter, its history, structure 
and parameters, not obtainable through traditional 
teaching (Noddings & Shore, 1984).
This inability to predict accurately where subject 
matter investigations will lead is frightening as it 
requires that we relinquish the illusion of control over 
learning. While it is reasonable to assume that a rich 
environment for investigating mathematical topics will 
include a certain "core," exactly when and how that core 
will be addressed is unknown; indeed, certain aspects may 
not be addressed at all. In the case of something like 
the "basic facts" of arithmetic, it is difficult to 
believe that this knowledge will not be deemed necessary 
and valuable, and that a self-organizing curriculum that 
draws upon intuitive powers of understanding will not 
include this information, but we cannot guarantee that all 
students will always learn the multiplication tables in 
the third grade.2
20f course, this is not guaranteed by current 
practice either, but it is currently presumed to be a 
reachable and desirable goal by many.
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Clearly, it is not the richness of the learning 
environment nor the depth of understanding made possible 
by a dynamic approach to curriculum and instruction that 
causes NCTM to shy away from openly advocating an emergent 
curriculum; the broad nature of the curriculum and 
evaluation vision that has been proposed (and warmly 
received) supports the notion of flexibility in setting 
initial goals. Although Curriculum and Evaluation 
Standards for School Mathematics embraces the idea that 
mathematical understanding is self-organizing and 
emergent, opposing the vision is the traditional notion of 
prediction and control.
Under the traditional vision, teachers select and 
sequence classroom experiences to facilitate engagement 
with certain ideas, possessing prior knowledge of what 
intuitions, ideas, and actions these experiences will 
elicit from students. Although encouraged to capitalize 
on the "teachable moment," that spark of insight that can 
lead students in divergent directions, teachers do not 
actively seek to provide the environment for divergence 
that can lead to generative chaos, but seek instead to 
present experiences that cause students' learning to 
center on the idea or skill to be mastered.
Direction is not the only aspect of this intuitive, 
emergent curriculum that is unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. The amount of time needed for knowing and
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understanding cannot be specified in advance of action.
An emergent curriculum is not bound to linear notions of
time; principles of recursion in dynamic systems suggest
that ideas must be revisited again and again without end
or beginning. Unlike repetition, with its focus on
mastery of performance through drill, recursion is
transformative reflection (Doll, 1993). Noddings & Shore
(1984) provide an example showing the value of educational
recursion worth quoting at length:
A curriculum that takes intuition seriously must 
build a considerable redundancy (or what appears 
on the surface as redundancy), for the inner eye 
. . . delights in familiar scenes colored by the
passage of time and the growth of perception.
Even in mathematics, where things are 
inevitably built one on the other, we fail to 
incorporate the appropriate amount of repetition 
[recursion] in our instruction. We teach the 
usual multiplication algorithm, for example, in 




Later we teach something called the 
"distributive property," but we rarely go back 
to our fourth grade problem and say, "Now let's 
try a different procedure on this. Instead of 
starting by saying '2 times 3 equals 6,' let's 
start at the upper left corner and say, '4 times 
2 equals 8' or '4 times 5 equals 20.' Where 
shall we write the '8' or the '20'?" Then we 
invite our students to invent their own 









There are, thus, both backward-looking and 
forward-looking aspects. . . .  On the one hand, 
we must make strange territory familiar in order 
to find our way about in it; on the other hand, 
we must occasionally make the familiar strange 
in order to look upon it with renewed interest 
and insight. (pp. 14 0-141)
The actions that the teacher will take to encourage
transformative reflection cannot be scripted in advance of
classroom interactions; how, when, and why to revisit
prior understandings emerges from the dynamic interactions
between students, teachers, and mathematics.
This interplay of forces places the teacher at a
crucial vertex in the network of the classroom: her role
is both as teacher-of-students and as student-of-teachers.
Although clearly purposeful, the actions of such a teacher
can be aimed at propelling the mathematical understanding
of students in specific directions, but the tentative
nature of the agreement between the teacher and the
students cannot support absolute demands for content
acquisition. Research by teachers on how they can provide
an environment for students that supports intuitive
learning in a climate of curriculum guides and graduation
examinations would begin to articulate a mathematics




In addition to exploring the development of 
mathematical intuition, research in mathematics education 
needs to explore women's knowing in mathematics more 
fully. Although the works of Belenky et al. (1986) and
Lave (1988) are certainly suggestive, they are an 
insufficient basis for drawing conclusions. In both 
cases, the research subjects were adults, not public 
school mathematics students; to understand better how 
women do or do not come to know mathematics it is 
important to listen to the voices of students still in 
public education as well as to those who are reflecting on 
their past school experiences.
Additionally, although a great deal of data have been 
collected on women's and men's knowing in mathematics as 
defined in schools, too little is known about nonstandard 
mathematical knowledge. In chapter 4, I argued that 
mathematics can have multiple meanings and domains of 
knowledge; research into differences and similarities 
between definitions and understandings of various groups, 
including women and men, will serve to enrich our 
understanding of what makes something "mathematical." It 
will also enrich our understanding of the relationship of 
gender to mathematical knowing.
It is important, too, to look beyond women's ways of 
knowing mathematics in schools to students' ways of
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knowing mathematics. This does not imply a retreat to the 
male-as-norm position of first generation feminism, nor 
should it necessarily evoke images of comparative studies. 
Instead the aim is to extend our understanding of how 
mathematics is known and how mathematics is done within 
classrooms as well as outside them. The focus need not be 
on altering patterns of participation, but on learning to 
recognize and value mathematical knowing in its multiple 
guises.
Such a research agenda presupposes that all students, 
indeed all people, possess mathematical ability, but that 
this ability will manifest itself in different ways for 
different students as well as in different ways for the 
same student at different times. The goal of research is 
to provide a basis on which to build methods of teaching 
that facilitate the growth of mathematical understanding 
and willingness to engage in mathematical activity, 
understood in broad, perhaps divergent, ways.
Although most of the research cited thus far has 
concentrated on gender differences in learning and 
pursuing mathematics, the significance of such differences 
are dubious. As Walden and Walkerdine (1990) argue, what 
is referred to as significance is usually based on some 
statistical test of significance. The use of the term 
significance gives these results "a legitimacy that can be 
over-rated" (p. 123) and makes the magnitude of the
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differences that can be detected seem larger than the data 
support.
In the report of the results from the second National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (Carpenter, et al., 
1981), concern was expressed over the finding that the 
majority of high school students take only two years of 
mathematics, and the authors reported "less difference in 
male and female enrollment in mathematics classes than 
might have been predicted from earlier studies" (p. 149). 
This raises questions about male underparticipation and 
underachievement in mathematics, factors hidden by the 
research focus of the first and of the second generation.
Bevond Gender
The concerns and efforts of first generation
researchers notwithstanding, there are strong indications
in the literature that concerns about gender differences
in mathematics learning are misplaced, and that the effort
now being expended to discover the "truth" about gender
and to design and implement interventions to retain female
mathematics students should be redirected toward improving
the mathematics education of all students. To support
such a claim, researchers compare the magnitude of within-
group variation to that of between-group variation.
Bleier (1984) comments:
Whatever characteristic is measured, the range 
of variation is far greater among males or among
165
females than between the two sexes. There is, 
in fact, far greater scientific and perhaps 
social justification for exploring and trying to 
understand the vast variance among individuals 
than the elusive, tiny variances between the 
sexes that elicit far greater attention and 
expenditure of resources than they merit. (p.
109)
In a comparison of the effects of grade and gender on 
mathematical attitude, Eccles, et al. (1985) found that
grade effects were both more numerous and stronger than 
gender effects, and that attitude is negatively affected 
by the amount of time spent in school. Although this 
study did find that gender has an impact on mathematical 
attitude, and thereby on participation, the impact of 
positive/negative reinforcement via grades was much 
greater.
In an analysis of recipients of bachelor's degrees 
from 1971 to 1976, Chipman and Thomas (1985) found that 
women received roughly 40% of all bachelor's degrees in 
mathematics; in the same period, women received, on 
average, 44% of all bachelor's degrees. However, in 1975, 
less than 2% of all bachelor's degrees awarded were 
received in mathematics or statistics. Although the 
difference between women and men may be statistically 
significant in this case, the difference between the 
number of students pursuing college degrees and the number 
pursuing them in mathematics is "significantly more 
significant" than the gender difference.
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Furthermore, Chipman and Thomas found that all 
professional and vocational degree programs reflect 
greater gender segregation than do liberal arts programs, 
not merely "mathematics-related" programs. They 
conjectured that, where students in a professional or 
vocational program are looking toward some specific 
occupation, students in liberal arts programs choose their 
majors out of a deep love of subject rather than its 
perceived utility. This conjecture, coupled with the 
dismally low percentage of college mathematics graduates, 
suggests that, in general, neither women nor men graduate 
from high school and enter college with a deep love of 
mathematics.
In 1976, John Ernest found gender differences in 
course-taking behavior but did not find gender differences 
in attitude towards mathematics. If students of both 
genders dislike mathematics to roughly the same degree, 
why are males more likely to pursue professional or 
vocational programs that draw heavily on mathematical 
ability? Sheila Tobias (1978) attempted to answer this 
question by taking into account the similarity of 
attitudes expressed by students of mathematics and gender 
differences in course-taking: "Men are not free to avoid 
math; women are" (p. 70). Although men may hate 
mathematics, Tobias suggests that since men occupy (at 
least in popular consciousness if not in fact) the
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cultural position of "breadwinner," this denies them the 
option of avoiding mathematics.3 Because a man will be 
expected to "provide for the family," and because 
mathematics-related occupations are generally among the 
more lucrative options, cultural rather than intellectual 
or affective forces may direct men toward mathematics in 
greater numbers.
Although the research of the first generation has 
been critiqued often, it is perhaps not without merit 
entirely. In chapter 4, I averred that the way in which 
mathematics is defined is central in understanding the 
mathematical abilities of women; I also maintained that 
women engage in activity that is not seen as mathematical. 
It seems reasonable then to assume that men also engage in 
unrecognized mathematical activity which may or may not 
differ from that in which women engage in significant 
ways. If the goal is to increase the mathematical power 
of all students, not just of women, research must look at 
the "nonstandard" mathematical activities of men as well 
as that of other groups. The position of NCTM (1991d) is 
clear:
By "every child" we mean specifically students 
who have been denied access in any way to 
educational opportunities as well as those who 
have not; students who are African American,
Hispanic, American Indian, and other minorities
3Another example of how fictions about male and 
female can function in truth in the lives of men and women 
(Walkerdine, 1990).
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as well as those who are considered to be part 
of the majority; students who are female as well 
as those who are male; students who have not 
been successful in school and in mathematics as 
well as those who have been successful. (p. 4)
If this goal is to be attained, then research which
investigates the ways in which all students and groups of
students come to know and use mathematics is needed.
To be inclusive, such research must also look beyond
the standard categories of race, class, and gender which,
even taken together, cannot describe the complexity of
students' social positioning. To increase the resolution
of the picture, different cultural, regional, geographical
understandings of mathematics need to be investigated.
Unlike the difference research of the first generation,
the rationale for this research is not primarily
comparative but exploratory, not to privilege certain
views over others, but to enrich the understanding of all
by validating the contributions and abilities of each.
Such research will not form hierarchies by implying that
the understandings of one group be shaped to conform to
those of another group.
Central to this research agenda is the
acknowledgement that mathematics is defined in different
ways by different groups. For mathematicians, teachers,
students, women, and men, the concept of mathematics holds
different, if overlapping, meanings. What counts as
"mathematical" must be constantly challenged in research
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and in schools if these multiple meanings are to be 
revealed. But this type of research cannot look only at 
the activities of women.
Out of this comes the central question for future 
research on women's and men's learning in mathematics:
"How can we teach mathematics . . . more effectively to
everyone?" (Chipman & Thomas, 1985, p. 23). Although 
studies characteristic of both the first and second 
generations will be necessary to develop answers to this 
question, the aim goes beyond those of either generation. 
Focussing on the ways in which students do and do not know 
mathematics, both in comparison and in isolation, in 
general as well as in particular, will provide critical 
insights into ways to improve learning, knowing, and 
teaching in mathematics for all students.
Beginning Again
For as long as I can remember, I have been attracted 
to mathematics. My interest in mathematics was fed by my 
father from an early age; all my scholastic pursuits were 
constantly and consistently praised and supported by my 
mother. Together my parents gave me a determination to 
realize my educational goals and an affinity toward 
mathematics. At the time I associated my father with 
mathematics and my mother with reading, but such an
170
association no longer seems valid, suggesting as it does 
that my father' was mathematical and my mother was not.
It is certainly true that my father possesses greater 
computational proficiency than my mother. I remember my 
parents sitting at the kitchen table sorting through the 
monthly bills and reconciling the bank statement with the 
checkbook records. My father held the register of checks, 
adding deposits and subtracting withdrawals to determine 
the balance as my mother sorted and stacked checks and 
bills. But the overt mathematical abilities displayed by 
my father should not suggest that my mother did not have 
equal, perhaps superior, mathematical abilities; these 
abilities, however, were not computational and therefore 
are not as readily recognized as mathematical.
Although my father was responsible for the 
computations necessary for reconciling the bank statement, 
my mother was (and is) responsible for determining how the 
family's financial resources were allocated. She was 
responsible for budgeting and spending, at which she 
excelled. My father sees no further than the amount of 
cash in his wallet; my mother made certain the monthly 
income lasted the entire month. I remember the lecture 
she gave me when my first check was returned for 
insufficient funds, which included a story about the time 
she was left with less than one dollar in the checking 
account. Although her computational skills are not as
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good as those of my father, my mother has never bounced a 
check. Neither has my father, but I have never seen him 
write a check or carry the checkbook.
But the mathematical abilities of my mother are not 
limited to making monetary decisions. As I related in 
chapter 1, each summer I went to McNeese State University 
in Lake Charles, Louisiana for seven weeks. Everything 
that I needed had to be taken, with the exception of food, 
including bedding and bath linens, books and notebooks, 
clothes, laundry supplies, a bicycle. About a month 
before the end of school, my mother would begin collecting 
together all of the necessities of the summer, packing 
things into suitcases, boxes, and the laundry basket and 
trashcan that I would be using. A few days before 
departure, she began deciding how to arrange this 
assortment of oddly-shaped containers in the trunk of her 
car. Before anything was taken from the house to the car, 
my mother had a general idea of where to begin packing so 
that everything would fit.
On at least one occasion, thinking that he would 
help, my father began packing the car without consulting 
my mother. He began with some of the largest items, but 
left space between them that was too small to accommodate 
any other items. In this fashion, he (and I) carried 
boxes and bags into the garage and piled them into the 
trunk. On finding the trunk nearly full and only half the
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luggage in the car, my mother quickly took over. Her 
first move was to empty the trunk. Not only did the car 
hold all the luggage I was taking, there was sufficient 
room to include snacks and drinks for the trip, and a 
picnic lunch for along the way.
These abilities at relating objects in space are not 
limited to packing the car. Her deftness allows her to 
store many pots, pans, and other kitchen gadgets in little 
space; for example, she has carefully determined in which 
order to stack her collection of storage bowls so that 
they all fit neatly inside one another (and which are 
exactly alike in size and are interchangeable for 
stacking) and always stacks them in the best way. 
Additionally, the stacks she forms, unlike those of my 
father or myself, are always balanced and never tip over. 
Finally, the stacks are arranged in the cupboards so that 
items used most often at nearest to where they are usually 
used, and space that is difficult to access, like the back 
of each cupboard, is used to store things used least 
often.
Although she would almost certainly deny it, my 
mother is capable of intuitive mathematical thinking, 
perhaps more so than my father. This understanding is new 
to me -- I certainly never associated mathematics with my 
mother until beginning this search for my own place in the 
literature on women in mathematics. The search for my
self and my voice, which became and still becomes this 
dissertation, is only beginning, but I know at last that I 
have found the path.
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